CDMA 서비스의 보안취약성과 개선방안

(An Enhanced Mechanism of Security Weakness in CDMA Service)

류 대 현 † 장 승 주 ††
(Dae-Hyun Ryu) (Seung Ju Jang)

요 약 이동통신 서비스는 무선통신의 속성상 채널이 노출되어있다고 볼 수 있으므로 도청의 가능성을 갖는다. 현재 국내에서 서비스되고 있는 CDMA 방식의 이동통신 서비스는 각 가입자마다 통화로 설정 과정에서 고유한 PN을 이용하여 정보가 확산되므로 일반적인 경우 도청이 어렵다고 알려져 있다. 본 연구에서는 먼저, CDMA 시스템의 순방향 채널을 분석하여 가입자 단말기의 ESN 및 MIN가 알려지는 경우 도청이 가능함을 보였다. 현재 국내에서 서비스되고 있는 CDMA 시스템에서는 호처리 과정에서 ESN 및 MIN이 무선채널 상에서 노출되고 있으므로 비교적 간단한 방법으로 순방향 통화채널을 모니터 할 수 있다. 본 논문에서는 순방향 통화채널의 모니터링을 통하여 CDMA 서비스의 보안취약성과 개선방안을 제시하였다.

키워드 : CDMA, 채널, ESN, MIN, 보안 취약성

Abstract Mobile Communication has a possibility of eavesdropping by nature of wireless channel. It is known that eavesdropping of *CDMA* system is impossible because the voice data spreads with the PN. First of all, we show that it is possible to eavesdrop the *CDMA* channel by analysis of the forward channel in case that we know the ESN and the MIN. We can monitor the forward traffic channel with easy since ESN and MIN are exposed during the call processing in *CDMA* service in Korea. In this paper, we will show security weakness and propose an enhanced mechanism for *CDMA* service. We consider the problem of security in the *CDMA* service. *CDMA* system has wireless channels to transmit voice or data. By this reason, *CDMA* communication has a possibility of being eavesdropped by someone. It is known that eavesdropping in *CDMA* system is impossible because the voice data spreads with the PN. However, we can eavesdrop the *CDMA* data in *FCM* protocol in case that we know the ESN and the MIN. In *CDMA* system, ESN and MIN are exposed to the wireless channel. In this paper, we analyze the flow of the voice and signal in the *CDMA* system and monitor the forward traffic channel by the *FCM* protocol. The *FCM* protocol is proposed to monitor the forward channel in *CDMA* system. We can show the possibility of monitoring in one-way channel of *CDMA* system by the *FCM* protocol. The test instrument based on the *FCM* protocol is proposed to monitor the *CDMA* forward channel. We will show the system architecture of the test instrument to monitor the forward channel in *CDMA*.

Key words : CDMA, channel, ESN, MIN, weakness of CDMA

1. Introduction

As the cellular telephony industry has boomed, the need for security has increased: both for privacy and fraud prevention. All cellular communications are sent over a radio link and anyone with the appropriate receiver can passively eavesdrop all cell phone transmissions in the area without fear of detection. In 1992, the wireless industry adopted an encryption system that was deliberately less secure than what knowledgeable experts had recommended at that time. As a result, the potential of eavesdropping has always existed and some say that it has been waiting for criminals with advanced

† 정 회 원 : 한세대학교 IT학부 교수
dhryu@hansei.ac.kr
†† 정 회 원 : 동의대학교 컴퓨터공학과 교수
sjjang@deu.ac.kr
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techniques to exploit[1-4].

The cellular telephony industry workers are especially concerned with fraud prevention. Cell phone cloning is probably the foremost form of fraud prevention problem. As today's most cell phones identify themselves over public radio links by sending their identity information in the clear, eavesdroppers can get easily others' identity information to make fraudulent phone calls. The latest digital cell phones currently offer some protection against casual eavesdroppers. In addition, digital technology is so new that inexpensive digital scanners have not yet been available widely.

The analysis methods were deal with numerous techniques for computation of 18-bit hash codes from the 152-bit message block for *CDMA*(Code Division Multiple Access) cellular systems. The *MS*(Mobile Station) operates in conjunction with the *BS*(Base Station) to authenticate the identity for the *MS*. Authentication is the process by which information is exchanged between the *MS* and the *BS* for the purpose of confirming the identity of the *MS*. A successful outcome of the authentication process occurs only when it can be demonstrated that the *MS* and the *BS* process identical sets of Shared Secret Data (SSD)[5-9]. The major authentication of proposed techniques are based on cryptography where encryption of the information with a random key is employed[10-12].

We consider the problem of security in the *CDMA* mobile communication. Mobile communication has an attribute of wireless. By this reason, mobile communication has a possibility of being eavesdropped by someone. The Distributed Sample Acquisition (DSA) technique [1], recently presented for fast acquisition of long-period Pseudo Noise (PN) sequences, substantially outperforms the existing Serial Search Acquisition (SSA) technique [5] in acquisition time performance. However, in case of knowing the ESN(Electronic Serial Number) and MIN(Mobile station Identification Number), we can eavesdrop the *CDMA* data by the *FCM* (Forward Channel Monitoring) protocol. In *CDMA* system, the ESN and MIN are exposed to the wireless channel[13]. We can easily know the ESN and MIN value by using HP8924C instrument.

The forward channel spreads the data by the Walsh Code, but the reverse *CDMA* channel spreads the data by the Long Code[5,10]. While sending data to the *BS* on the access channel, the *MS*(Mobile Station) constructs the mask with the *BS*(Base Station) identity, the paging channel number, and the access channel number. While sending traffic to the *BS*, the *MS* uses the constructed mask from its ESN(Electronic Serial Number)[1,6]. We consider the problem of security in the *CDMA*. It is known that eavesdropping in *CDMA* system is impossible because they spread the voice data wrapping with the Pseudo Noise (PN).

First of all, we show that it is possible to eavesdrop the *CDMA* channel by analysis of the forward channel in case that we know the ESN and the MIN. We can monitor the forward traffic channel with easy since ESN and MIN are exposed during the call processing in *CDMA* service in Korea. In this paper, we will show security weakness and propose an enhanced mechanism for *CDMA* service. This paper was structured and outlined in the following order: Section 2 - Signal Flow of Forward Channel, Section 3 - Security Architecture and Security Issues of *CDMA* System, Section 4 - Monitoring of Forward Traffic Channel and Experiments, Section 5 - Conclusion.

2. Signal Flow of Forward Channel

The long code is a period 2^{42}-1 LFSR(Linear Feedback Shift Registers) sequence that is used for spreading the reverse link. There is only one long code *sequence*. Different stations are distinguished not by the sequence itself but by its *relative phase*. The fact that the long code is added to each of the two (I and Q) short code sequences to ensure cross correlation between signals from distinct stations[14,15]. The long code LFSR tap polynomial is as follows:

$$G(X) = X^{42} + X^{35} + X^{33} + X^{31} + X^{27} + X^{26} + X^{25} + X^{22} + X^{21} + X^{19} + X^{18} + X^{17} + X^{16} + X^{10} + X^{7} + X^{6} + X^{5} + X^{3} + X^{2} + X^{1} + 1 \quad (1)$$

When transmitting to an access channel, the *MS* constructs the mask from the *BS* identity, the paging channel number, and the access channel

number. When transmitting traffic channel, the *MS* uses a mask constructed from its ESN(Electronic Serial Number)[16,17]. Hadamard-Walsh functions(H_M in eq. (2)) are binary orthogonal sequences, with power-of-two lengths. They can be generated by the recursion [6,11,14].

$$H_M = \begin{pmatrix} H_{M/2} & H_{M/2} \\ H_{M2} & -H_{M/2} \end{pmatrix} \quad (2)$$

where

$$H_M = \begin{pmatrix} +1 & +1 \\ +1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$$

and M is a power of two. The rows of any instance form a mutually orthogonal set over the inner product. The Walsh functions of order 64 are used as orthogonal cover on the forward link channels. They are also used as orthogonal modulation symbols in the reverse link. Although the functions are the same, they are used for entirely different purposes in the forward and reverse links [18-22].

There are three types of overhead channel in the forward link: pilot, sync, and paging. The pilot is required in every station. The paging channel is the vehicle for communicating with mobile stations when they are not assigned to a traffic channel. As the name implies, its primary purpose is to convey pages, that is, notifications of incoming calls, to the mobile stations. It carries the responses to the *MS* accesses, both page responses and unsolicited originations. Successful accesses are normally followed by an assignment to a dedicated traffic channel[23-27].

The code channels are mathematically orthogonal. The orthogonality is established by covering the FEC(Forward Error Correction) code symbols with one of sets of 64 so-called Walsh functions. As only whole periods of the Walsh functions occur in each code symbol, the effect of the Walsh cover is to make the channels completely separable in the receiver, at least in the absence of multi-path. The orthogonality means not only that there is no co-mingling of channels, but that there is no interference between users in the same cell. This has a substantially beneficial effect on the forward link capacity. All the channels are added together and sent to the modulator. When the BS supports multiple forward *CDMA* channels, frequency division multiplex is used[28-31].

The PN code of period 242-1 chips is used in IS-95 systems at a chipping rate of 1.2288 Mchips/sec. This PN code is called the long code because its period is much longer than that of the pilot or short PN codes which are 215 or 32,768 chips. At the chipping rate of 1.2288 Mchips/sec, the time period of the pilot code is only 262/3 msec or exactly 75 periods every 2 seconds. Figure 1 is a forward traffic channel structure.



Figure 1 Forward Traffic Channel Structure

Each mobile unit is identified as the following sets of numbers. The first number is the Mobile Identification Number (MIN). This 34 bits binary number is derived from the unit's telephone number, MIN1 is the last seven digits of the telephone number and MIN2 is the area code. The MIN is your telephone number. MINs are keypad programmable. You or a dealer can assign any number what you want. A MIN is ten digits long. A MIN is not your directory number since it is not long enough to include a country code. Figure 2 shows the data flow between the *MS* and the *BS*.

3. Security Architecture of the CDMA System

3.1 CDMA Data Channel

The authentication system with TIA/EIA/IS-95 standard in cellular phone provides authentication, signaling message encryption, and voice privacy. To provide these services, The CAVE(Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption Algorithm), CMEA(Cellular Message Encryption Algorithm), and PN sequence were used. In an effort to enhance the authentication process and to protect sensitive subscriber information (such as PINS), a method is needed to encrypt certain fields of selected traffic channel signaling messages. The CAVE algorithm is used as authenticated signature algorithm, the CMEA is used as signal encryption algorithm, and PN sequence is used as voice privacy. The range of security in *CDMA* is constrained between the



Figure 2 Data Flow between the MS and the BS

authentication and encryption for the MS and the BS like Figure 2.

3.1.1 The Authentication System

The *CDMA* system confirms the *MS* by communicating the shared secret data, i.e., the SSD between the BS and the MS. The calculation procedure of authenticated value is the same in both stations. The CAVE algorithm is used for the authenticated procedure. The SSD is composed of the SSD_A and SSD_B. The SSD is stored into semi-permanent semiconductor of the *MS*. The *CDMA* uses the SSD_A for authentication function and SSD_B for voice privacy and signaling message encryption.

3.1.1.1 Forward Link

There are three types of overhead channel in the forward link: pilot, sync, and paging. The whole number of the forward link is 64 channels that are one pilot channel, one sync channel, maximum seven paging channels, and 55 traffic channels. The QPSK(Quadrature Phase Shift Keying) was to be used to demodulate the channel. Figure 1 shows the structure of the forward link.

1) Pilot Channel

The pilot channel is required in every station. The phase reference is used to demodulate the receiving data from other channel in the *MS*. The W0 Walsh Function is assigned with the pilot channel that also uses the PN sequence for the QPSK demodulation. The pilot PN sequence that is derived from the fifteen shift registers is used in the I-Channel and Q-Channel. The primitive polynomial for generation of PN sequence is as follows eq. (3), (4).:

$$PN(x) = x^{15} + x^{13} + x^9 + x^8 + x^7 + x^5 + 1 \quad (3)$$

$$PNQ(x) = X^{15} + x^{12} + x^{11} + x^{10} + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1 \quad (4)$$

2) Sync Channel

The sync channel is available for determination of the initialization variable in power on system of the mobile system. The data of sync channel includes the identification number of the *BS*, pilot power amplifier, and phase offset for the PN sequence.

3) Paging Channel

The paging channel operates at a data rate of 4800 or 9600 bps and transmits overhead information, pages, and orders to a *MS*. The paging channel message is similar to the form of the sync channel message. The message length includes the header, body, and CRC, except the padding. Paging Channel messages can use synchronized capsules that end on a half-frame boundary or unsynchronized capsules that end anywhere within a half-frame. The paging channel has W1~W7 Walsh function. The hash function is available for assigning the paging channel into the *MS*. The hash function is as follows eq. (5).:

$$R = \lfloor (N \times ((40503 \times (L \oplus H \oplus DECORR)) \bmod 2^{16}) / 2^{16} \rfloor \quad (5)$$

(Where R is paging slot number(hashed value), *N* is channel number(seven), *L* is lower sixteen bits of hash key, *H* is upper sixteen bits of hash key, *DECOOR* is decorrelate hash value;N : total slot number = 2048; DECOOR =6XHASH_KEY [0,1,2,…11]; HASY_KEY=MIN1+2^24XMIN2)

To determine the page channel the hash key is used fixed number or phone number of mobile station, available channel number seven, and DECORR hash value.

4) Traffic Channel

The traffic channel includes the real voice, which is transformed into the digital signal by QCEP (QualComm Code Excited Linear Predictive Coding). The voice signal is transformed into electronic control data by MUX of 800bps electronic data before assigning the Walsh function.

3.1.1.2 Reverse Link

The channel number of a reverse link is 64 bits. Maximum 32 access channels and 64 traffic channels were used. The QPSK was used to demodulate the channel.

1) access channel

The reply, command, and registration of page are included into the access channel. The transfer rate of data in the access channel is 4.8 Kbps. The data passes Convolution Encoder, Repetition, and Block Interleaving. Walsh function creates new data with 6 bits group data and amplified by Long Code PN sequence.

2) traffic channel

The traffic channel has a voice data and signal data like the forward link channel.

3) *CDMA* system communication

The MSC(Mobile Switching Center) in the *CDMA* communication manages the wireless frequency, channel, the track of the *MS*, and handoff mechanism. The HLR(Home Location Register) manages the home position of user. The HLR also manages the user identification and data during communication. VLR(Visitor Location Register) manages the temporary data that is not enrolled as a normal user. The AC(Authentication Center) handles the user key for an user authentication.

3.2 Security Mechanism and Issues for the Long Code Mask and the CMEA Algorithm

The security is achieved for the forward link and the reverse link. The following polynomial (6) is long code sequence in Figure 3.:

$$f(x) = x^{42}+x^{41}+x^{40}+x^{39}+x^{37}+x^{36}+x^{35}+x^{32}+x^{26}+x^{25}+x^{24}+ x^{23}+x^{21}+x^{20}+x^{17}+x^{16}+x^{15}+x^{11}+x^{9}+x^{7}+x^{1} \quad (6)$$

3.2.1 Security Mechanism for Long Code Mask in the Paging Channel

The Long Code Mask in the paging channel is Figure 4. The PCN(Paging Channel Number) is the channel number which has a seven paging channels. Therefore, the '000' through '110' were used. The paging channel number are decrypted easily, because the hash function uses the channel number as known value. The PILOT_PN is given 0 to 512 as a random combination. We can get easily the PILOT_PN when we are monitoring the pilot channel.

3.2.2 Security Mechanism for Long Code Mask in the Traffic Channel

The long code provides voice privacy in CDMA system. The long code is a PN sequence with 2^{42} - 1 that is used for scrambling on the forward CDMA channel and spreading the reverse CDMA channel. The long code is characterized by the mask of long code that is used to form either the public long code or the private long code.

Figure 5 shows the Long Code Mask in the traffic channel. The Public Long Code Mask and the Private Long Mask were used by managing the Encrypt-Mode in the message field on Forward Traffic Channel. In case of Encrypt-Mode is 00, it is disabled encryption mode and created Long Code using Public Long Code Mask.

The Public Long Code Mask is only composed of the combination ESN. Whenever the Encrypt-Mode is set as 01, the encryption mode is used. In this case, the forty bits of the Private Long Code Mask were used. The Private Long Code Mask is created with 34 bits MIN and SSD_B field. The same phone number is always created as the same Long Code Mask. The Private Long Code Mask is simple



Figure 3 Long Code Sequence



Figure 4 Long Code Mask Format in the Paging Channel



Figure 5 Long Code Mask Format in the Traffic Channel (MFR : ManuFactuRe)

structure that uses linear recursive register. For the viewpoint of cryptography theory, it has almost unsecured feature.

3.3 Authentication

The authentication mechanism is the procedure that identifies an user of the *MS*. Whenever both the *BS* and the *MS* are the same secret key, the authentication procedure will be done. A-key, COUNT, and SSD parameters are stored into the nonvolatile memory.

4. The FCM Protocol and Experiments

It is easy to monitor the forward channel of *CDMA*. We propose the *FCM* protocol to monitor the forward channel. The monitoring equipment that includes the *FCM* protocol is developed by modifying the terminal S/W partially and the *CDMA* terminal. The monitor equipment that is a hardware part of the *FCM* protocol is divided into two parts that are logic circuit and RF circuit. The logic circuits are MSM(Mobile Station Modem), Audio PCM Codec, speaker, memory, PC(Personal Computer), and UART. RF circuit, which transforms *CDMA* signal into BASE BAND signal, has BBA (Base Band Analog Processor), PLL(Phase Locked Loop), AMP, and filter. Figure 6 shows the block diagram of the logic circuit for the *FCM* protocol.



Figure 6 The Block Diagram of the Logic Circuit for the *FCM* protocol



Figure 7 Software Structure for the Monitoring System



Figure 8 Experiment System Environment

The monitoring software architecture for forward traffic channel is shown in Figure 8. The system software architecture is composed of the REX(Real Time Executable) Operating System which includes multitasking structure. The REX Operating System is developed by Qualcom. Corp., which is executed on the Intel processor 80x86. REX O.S is based on priority preemption scheduling that provides task change. Also it provides system call interface that is task creation, timing related service, suspense and resume of task. REX O.S uses the data structure of TCB(Task Control Block) to manage the task efficiently. When we power on the device, the real time Operating System is running with Main Control(MC) task. The Main Control task initializes the hardware of DECODER, ENCODER, and VOCODER and creates the whole tasks.

Someone can monitor the communication channel in IS95-A protocol in case of not using authentication algorithm or encryptor. We can easily know the ESN and MIN value by using HP8924C instrument. Moreover, The CSM(Cell Site Modem) is available to monitor the ESN and MIN value.

This paper suggests monitoring methodology of call processing procedure for forward channel in IS95-A protocol. There are two kinds of monitors in forward channel: Mobile origination call and mobile terminated call. There are six kinds of cases in service options that are provided by the *BS*, and the *MS*.

4.1 Call Processing to Monitor the Mobile Origination Call

The service options that are used currently are service option 1 and service option 3 for a voice communication. The service option 1 is voice communication based on 8Kbyte Q-CELP codec. The service option 3 is voice communication based on 8K-EVRC Codec. We should consider three types (below case A, B, and C) of call origination processing procedure for the sake of service options, which are provided by the *BS* and the *MS*.

The test instrument cannot know the fact that the *MS* sends call by the service option 1 or service option 3. However, the test instrument can use the same option as the *MS* option by monitoring the forward messages, which are negotiated the *MS* with the *BS*.

A. The MS : Service Option 1, The BS : Service Option 1

[Algorithm 1] is an algorithm at *MS* for receiving message from *BS*. The *MS* receives Channel Assignment Message(MSG_{cam}) from BS((3) statement in [Algorithm 1]). The *BS* sends Base Station Acknowledgement Order(MSG_{bsao}) to the *MS*((4) statement in [Algorithm 1]). Next, The *MS* receives Alert with Information Message(MSG_{aim}) ((5) statement in [Algorithm 1]). After establishing the status of communication between *BS* and *MS*, data is communicated with each station.

We can easily know the ESN and MIN value by using HP8924C instrument. Moreover, The CSM(Cell Site Modem) is available to monitor the ESN and MIN value. This paper suggests *FCM* protocol for call processing procedure in IS95-A protocol. There are two kinds of monitoring methods in forward channel: Mobile origination call and mobile terminated call. There are six kinds((3) statements in [Algorithm 2]) of cases in service options that are provided by the *BS* and the *MS*.

We should consider three types of call origination processing procedure for the sake of service options, which are provided by the *BS* and the *MS*. The service options that are used currently are service option 1 and service option 3 for voice communication. The service option 1 is the voice communication based on 8Kbyte Q-CELP Codec. The service option 3 is the voice communication based on 8K-EVRC Codec. We just show the *FCM* protocol in the service option 1((4) statement in [Algorithm 2]) (8-K EVRC), because other cases are similar to service option 1.

```
Input : Receive Page Message from BS
Output : Conversion between MS and BS
Algorithm
begin
(1) Rcv(MSG_page, BS, MIN);
(2) Send(MSG_page, BS, MIN, ESN);
(3) Rcv(MSG_cam, BS, ESN, CDMA_CH,
    CODE_CH);
(4) Rcv(MSG_bsao, BS);
(5) Rcv(MSG_aim, BS);
(6) Send(MSG_ack, BS);
(7) Ans(MS);
(8) Send(MSG_co, BS);
(9) Rcv(MSG_ack, BS);
(10 WHILE(!DISCON) begin
(11)     Comm(MS, BS);
(12) end
end.
```

[Algorithm 1] Algorithm for Receiving Message from *BS* at *MS*

```
Input : Receive Message from MS
Output : Grabbing Pa's Data
Algorithm
begin
(1) Initialize HP89294C;
(2) GET(ESN, MIN, Pa, HP89294C);
(3) So = {S1,S2,S3,S4,S5,S6}
(4) St(MS) = (S1 || S3) | So;
(5) St(BS) = {S1 | So}
(6) St(ME) = St(MS)
(7) SEND(MSG_org, MS, BS, S1);
(8) MSG_ack = ASSIGN(MSG_ch, MS);
(9) if(MSG_ack != NULL) begin
(10)      WAIT(Srv, MS);
(11)      SEND(MSG_soro, BS, MS, S1);
(12)      WAIT(Srv, BS);
(13)      DISCON(Srv, MS);
(14)      WHILE (Channel is connected)
(15)      begin
(16)           SEND(MSG_data, BS, MS, S1);
(17)           WRITE(MSG_data, PC);
(18)           SEND(MSG_data, MS, BS, S1);
(19)           WRITE(MSG_data, PC);
(20)      end
(21) end
end.
```

[Algorithm 2] Algorithm for *FCM* Protocol

Figure 9 and [Algorithm 2] show the monitoring procedure of call processing that the *MS* supports the service option 1 and the *BS* supports service option 1, respectively. When the *MS* sends the origination message to the *BS* by service option 1,



Figure 9 Data Flow of Call Processing to Monitor the Mobile Origination Call
(In Case of the Mobile Station Sends Service Option 1)

the *BS* assigns the communication channel to the *MS* whether it is enrolled or not ((7) statement in [Algorithm 2]). When the *MS* gets the assigned message of channel ((8) statement in [Algorithm 1]), it waits for the service negotiation ((10) statement in [Algorithm 1]) through the forward communication channel and backward communication channel. Also the test instrument acknowledges the fact that the *MS* sends the call. And then the test instrument starts monitoring data from the assigned communication channel ((14) to (21) statement in [Algorithm 2]). The *BS* serves the service option 1 from the call of the *MS* and sends the assigned message for channel through call channel. After this, the *BS* sends the Service Option Response Order message to forward communication channel and waits for the service negotiation. The *MS* disconnects the service negotiation and communicates with the *BS* when it receives Service Option Response Order message ((13) statement in [Algorithm 2]). The test instrument detects the service option, stores the whole voice packets from forward channel, and sends the monitored voice packets to the PC((14) to (21) statements in [Algorithm 2]). When finishing the call, the *BS* sends release order to the forward channel. The *MS* and the test instrument end the call, when it receives the Release Order message. The theorem for the *FCM* protocol shows that the *BS* and the *MS* are equal to the same data in communicating each other.

B. The *MS* : Service Option 3, The *BS* : Service Option 1

Figure 10 shows the monitoring procedure of call processing that the *MS* supports the service option 3 and the *BS* supports service option 1, respectively. When the *MS* sends the origination message to the *BS* by service option 3, the *BS* assigns the communication channel to the *MS* whether it is decided to enroll or not. When the *MS* gets the assigned message of channel, it is waiting for the service negotiation through the forward communication channel and backward communication channel. Also the test instrument acknowledges the fact that the *MS* sends the call and start monitor from the assigned communication channel. The dotted arrow line is monitoring a data from the *MS* using the *FCM* protocol.

C. The *MS* and the *BS* : the Service Option 3

Figure 11 shows the monitoring procedure of call processing that both the *MS* and the *BS* support call service option 3, respectively. When the *MS* sends the origination message to the *BS* by service option 3, the *BS* assigns the communication



Figure 10 In Case of The Mobile Station Sends Service Option 3 and The Base Station Supports Service Option 1



Figure 11 In Case of The Mobile Station Sends Service Option 3 and The Base Station Also Supports Service Option 3

channel to the *MS* whether it is decided to enroll or not. When the *MS* gets the assigned message of channel, it is waiting for the service negotiation through the forward communication channel and backward communication channel. Also the test instrument acknowledges the fact that the *MS* sends the call and start monitor from the assigned communication channel. The dotted arrow line is

monitoring a data from the *MS* using the *FCM* protocol.

By analyzing this experiment, the CDMA system must have weak point as follow. In paging channel, the Long Mask shows Figure 12. All fields of the Long Mask are created by a station. The PCN has seven paging channel, so that it is represented three bits like '000' to '111'. The paging channel number is made from hash function using knowing data. The paging channel number can be decrypted easily. The PILOT_PN can be got from monitoring pilot channel.



Figure 12 Long Mask of the Paging Channel

In access channel, the Long Mask of the access channel shows Figure 13. The ACN that are the access channel number has been got from the paging channel that are the maximum thirty-two. The information of the access channel is opened data because of it is delivery by the paging channel. The BASE_ID that is station identification can be got by monitoring the sync channel. Therefore, the Long Mask of the access channel can be generated randomly.



Figure 13 Long Mask of the Access Channel

5. An Enhanced Mechanism for CDMA Service

The long code provides voice privacy in CDMA system. The long code is a PN sequence with 2^{42} - 1 that is used for scrambling on the forward CDMA channel and spreading the reverse CDMA channel. The long code is characterized by the long code mask that is used to form either the public long code or the private long code. There are two kinds of Long Code Mask for traffic channel containing voice information. Public Long Code Mask or Private Long Mask can be chosen by Encrypt-Mode bits of the message field in traffic channel. In case of Encrypt-Mode is 00, it is disabled encryption mode and created Long Code using Public Long Code Mask. Public Long Code Mask used usually is only composed of permutated ESN. Public Long Code Mask mode has security weakness since ESN and MIN is exposed during the call processing in *CDMA* service.

Whenever the Encrypt-Mode is set as 01, the encryption mode is used. In this case, the forty bits of the Private Long Code Mask was used. The Private Long Code Mask is created with 34 bits MIN and SSD_B field. The same phone number is always created as the same Long Code Mask. The Private Long Code Mask is simple structure that uses linear recursive register. For the viewpoint of cryptography theory, it has almost unsecured feature. Therefore, Private Long Code Mask must be used for voice privacy in CDMA service. Moreover, ESN must be encrypted not to be exposed during the call processing and more complex cryptographic algorithm must be used to generate long code.

6. Conclusions

The *CDMA* technology is generally known as powerful security during communication. However, the communication data might be eavesdropped and forged, because the mobile communication sends data through wireless communication channel. So it is essentially necessary to setup the entire system securely. This paper analyzes the security hole and proves a weak point of *CDMA* system. Based on the results, we emphasize the necessity of security in *CDMA* system. For the sake of this, we analyze the IS-95 protocol and propose the monitor mechanism of forward channel in call processing procedure. The IS-95 and GSM only define the security features between the mobile station and the base station.

The monitor equipment is divided into two parts that are a logic circuit part and RF circuit part. The logic circuits are MSM(Mobile Station Modem), Audio PCM Codec, speaker, memory, PC (Personal Computer), and UART. RF circuits, which transforms *CDMA* signal into BASE BAND

signal, are BBA, PLL, AMP, and filter. We propose only the methodology of the forward channel monitoring by modifying the terminal S/W partially in *CDMA* terminal. We propose S/W and H/W architecture for the call process of the forward channel monitor and analyze the call process procedure. The REX Operating System in equipment terminal was used to monitor the *CDMA* system. If we know the ESN and the MIN, we can eavesdrop the *CDMA* data. We can easily know the ESN and MIN value by HP8924C instrument.

We suggest the *FCM* protocol to monitor *CDMA* system. This paper proves a weakness of *CDMA* system using the *FCM* protocol. We also prove that the BS and the MS are the same data in communicating each other. We implement the test instruments including the *FCM* protocol. In the experiment of monitoring system based on the *FCM* protocol, we can monitor an user communication message by the monitoring environments. In the future, based on the result, we will suggest new system architecture for the secure *CDMA* system.

Mobile Communication has a possibility of eavesdropping by nature of wireless channel. It is known that eavesdropping of *CDMA* system is impossible because the voice data spreads with the PN. First of all, we show that it is possible to eavesdrop the *CDMA* channel by analysis of the forward channel in case that we know the ESN and the MIN. We can monitor the forward traffic channel with easy since ESN and MIN are exposed during the call processing in *CDMA* service in Korea. In this paper, we show security weakness and propose an enhanced mechanism for *CDMA* service.

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Dae-Hyun Ryu

Prof. Dae-Hyun Ryu received his B.S. degree, M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Electrical and Electronic Engineering from the Busan National University in 1983, 1985 and 1997, respectively. From 1987 to 1998, he joined at ETRI, where he worked as Senior Member of Technical Staff. In 1998, he joined the department of IT, Hansei University, Korea. His research interest is in the area of Digital image processing, Digital watermark and Information security system design

Seung Ju Jang

Prof. Seung Ju Jang received a B.Sc. degree in Computer Science and Statistics, and M.Sc. degree, and his Ph.D. in Computer Engineering, all from Busan National University, in 1985, 1991, and 1996, respectively. He is a member of IEEE and ACM. He has been an associate Professor in the Department of Computer Engineering at Dongeui University since 1996. He was a member of ETRI(Electronic and Telecommunication Research Institute) in Daejon, Korea, from 1987 to 1996, and developed the National Administration Multiprocessor Minicomputer during those years. His current research interests include fault-tolerant computing systems, distributed systems in the UNIX Operating Systems, multimedia operating systems, security system, and parallel algorithms