The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A (대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A)

The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers (대한전기학회)
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An Analytical Effects of Maximum Quantity Constraint on the Nash Solution in the Uniform Price Auction

발전기 최대용량 제약이 현물시장의 내쉬균형에 미치는 영향에 대한 해석적 분석

  • Published : 2003.06.01
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Abstract

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

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References

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