The Role of Compensation in Natural Resource Conflicts

자연자원분쟁에서 보상의 역할에 대한 연구

When landowners have private information about land value, compensation based on conservation value at the time of regulatory takings of land is impractical even though it generates an efficient outcome. No compensation rule to a landowner not only yields an inefficient outcome but also provides an ex ante pervasive incentive for the landowner to invest in lowering conservation value. An alternative rule of compensation based on the market value of the land provides ex ante incentives for landowner either to reduce conservation value or to increase it. Under the market value compensation rule, placing the burden of proof on landowner gives higher probability of conservation than placing it on regulator. Whether it is better to allure landowners to conserve by paying compensation with market value and placing the burden of proof on landowner through changes in the regulatory regime however depends on the magnitude of inefficiency, equity consideration and dynamic nature of property rights on environmental goods.