Propositionality and Metaphoricity of Metaphor

은유표현의 명제성과 은유성

The purpose of this paper is twofold. On the one hand it takes issue with Engstrom's claim that conceptual metaphors are propositional; on the other, it aims to demonstrate that the mathematical term 'mapping' is inappropriate for the analysis of metaphors. To my mind, the propositional analysis of metaphors, a wrong analysis for that matter, originates in the notion 'mapping' I argue that partial 'mapping' between propositional meanings and metaphorical meanings is either mental or psychological, with no concomitant 'truth' value. When concept metaphors represent propositionality, they lose metaphoricity; when they obtain metaphoricity, they are free of propositionality. The mathematical terms 'mapping' and 'proposition,' it is stressed, should be avoided in the analysis of concept metaphors like 'A is B' because they are confusing when applied to linguistic expression. 1 suggest that the term 'mapping' be replaced by phrases such as 'interaction between two domains,' projection from source-domain to target domain,' or 'understanding the properties of two domains between A and B,' etc. This would amount to proposing a pragmatic or cognitive theory of metaphor.