

Ecology and Naturalistic Justice in Nietzsche*

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Abstract : This paper examines how Nietzsche, criticizing anti-naturalist philosophies, reformulated concepts of nature and human nature, and reevaluated them from the perspective of naturalism. Especially, it focuses on his task for naturalistic ethics to naturalize nature and to place man back into nature. This paper also tries to reinterpret his attempt to transfer the concept of justice from the metaphysical realm to the naturalistic one, which seems to give some important insights to develop theory of environmental justice, while pointing out some limitations in his naturalistic concept of justice.

Key Words : Nietzsche, modernity, naturalism, ecology, environmental justice.

요약 : 본 논문은 니체가 반자연주의적 철학들을 비판하면서, 어떻게 자연의 개념 및 인간의 본질에 관한 개념을 재구성하고, 이들을 자연주의적 윤리의 관점에서 재평가하고자 했는가를 고찰하고자 한다. 특히 자연주의적 윤리에 근거하여, 자연을 자연화하며, 인간을 자연으로 되돌려 놓고자 하는 그의 과제에 초점을 두고 있다. 본 논문은 또한 정의의 개념을 형이상학적 영역에서 자연주의적 영역으로 전환시키고자 했던 그의 시도를 재해석하면서, 환경정의 이론의 개발을 위한 주요한 통찰력을 얻고자 하는 한편, 그의 자연주의적 정의관에 내재된 한계들을 지적하고자 한다.

주요어 : 니체, 근대성, 자연주의, 생태학, 환경정의

1. Introduction

Nietzsche's philosophy has come to play a pivotal role in the debate on significance of the transition from modernity to postmodernity. If modernity can be seen as a project under the Enlightenment tradition - the tradition which was heralded by Renaissance and Reformation (together with the discovery of the 'New World'), formulated through Enlightenment thinkers, from Descartes to Kant, and culminated in Hegel's metaphysics (Gare, 1995, pp.46-50; Dallmayr, 1997) - for progress towards greater rationality and freedom of human subjects in nature, Nietzsche's philosophy which characterized such a progress as

nihilism has provided a crucial motive for breaking with such a project, that is, for a turning point towards postmodernity, as Harvey (1989, p.18) describes that "... particularly after Nietzsche's intervention, it was no longer possible to accord Enlightenment reason a privileged status in the definition of the eternal and immutable essence of human nature".

Thus, for Nietzsche, "This is my *basic objection* to all philosophic-moralistic cosmologies and theodicies" which have been formulated through and supported by Western modernity (WP 707)¹⁾. Yet his philosophy was not merely destructive but also reconstructive. His thought can be seen as a 'total rejection of a nihilistically deflated

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modernity', but at the same time as a 'foundation for a new postmodern philosophy', which has been celebrated by contemporary poststructuralists such as Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze. According to Habermas (1987, ch.4), however, Nietzsche's perspective which once removed from rational standards was ultimately unable to legitimate itself, with the result that his metaphysics (or aesthetics) of the 'will to power' lacked a philosophical warrant. He could not 'justify the standards of aesthetic judgement', because Nietzsche owed his power-focused concept of modernity to a debunking critique of reason which places itself outside the horizons of reason.

In this paper, my intention is neither to represent systematically Nietzsche's philosophy, nor to clarify the debate between poststructuralists and Habermas on Nietzsche's philosophy. But I think that Nietzsche might try to find an exit route from modern subjective rationality, by 'returning to nature', by placing his attention upon a naturalistic conception of nature, man and ethics. Naturalism in general can be seen as a philosophical belief or tradition which wants to study the natural causes of events, and to explain or justify morality from nature or human nature. While denying supernaturalism, that is, the need for any explanation going beyond or outside of nature (or the earth). Some naturalists since Darwin have insisted especially upon the evolution, without supernatural intervention (i.e. God), of higher forms of life from lower. In the middle of the 19th century, these senses of naturalism and naturalist, either opposition to supernaturalism or the study of natural history (mainly biology) were predominant.

Under this kind of historical context, as Lampert (1993, p.11) argues, "the science Nietzsche advances is inquiry that has broken with both of its two great historic predecessors, the Platonic science of the transcendence of nature and the Baconian science of the mastery of nature". While complaining that contemporary interpretations of Nietzsche's

philosophy give little attention to his conception of nature (cf. Molres, 1990) and of naturalistic ethics (cf. Conway, 1995), many commentators such as Schatzki (1994) emphasizes significances of his naturalistic perspective, especially in terms of naturalization of nature, re-placement of man into nature, and the resulting reevaluation of traditional values. Nietzsche's philosophy has some important implications for contemporary ecology, as Kaulbach (1982), for instance, interprets his project for 'returning to nature' as a reaction to the alienation of modern man from nature that began when modern thought in the Western World set man up as a subject over against nature as mere objects.

I examine thus in this paper how Nietzsche, criticizing anti-naturalist philosophies, reformulated concepts of nature and of human beings in nature, and reevaluated them from his naturalistic ethics. Especially I highlight his task for naturalistic ethics which wanted to naturalize nature and to place man back into nature, and his attempt to transfer the concept of justice from the metaphysical realm to the naturalistic one. This kind of ecological interpretation of Nietzsche's work is not novel. For example, Hallman (1991), arguing the importance of Nietzsche's naturalistic philosophy for environmental ethics, "wants to view Nietzsche as a forerunner of deep ecology". Nietzsche's language and themes are very different from those, say, of the land ethics of Aldo Leopold (1949) who has been admitted explicitly as another forerunner by deep ecologists²⁾, or of Donna Haraway who can be compared with Nietzsche as another new sense of the edifying for the human species in nature (Conway, 1997, pp.134-139). Nevertheless, Nietzsche can be seen as a great ecologist and advocator of environmental justice, as Lampert (1993, p.279) emphasizes that "Nietzsche provides a comprehensive grounding in ontology and history, being and time, for the love of the earth".

But my attempt in this paper does not mean that

Nietzsche's naturalistic ethics can be translated into contemporary ecology and theory of environmental justice without any problems. Environmental justice is not merely concerned with nature, but also with the totality of life conditions in our communities. Nietzsche's naturalistic concept of justice however does not seem to connect properly between environmental and social justice. Thus it is very difficult to see how the concept of naturalistic justice can be applied to concrete environmental situations such as cities. This is the same case with other kinds of contemporary environmentalism, as Harvey (1996, p.391) points out that "usually depicted as the highpoint of the pollution and plundering of planet earth, cities ... are either ignored or denigrated in the deep ecology literature ...". It would be inappropriate to present "Nietzsche as an environmentalist of a deep ecological stripe" as Acampora (1994, p.187) suggests against Hallman's argument, even though it is apparent that he has seen an entirely new side of Nietzsche's texts for environmental ethics. This kind of confusion may arise partly due to different interpretations of Nietzsche's philosophy. Indeed, as Sedgwick (1995, p.1) writes in the 'introduction' to the book he edited, "reading Nietzsche is a process which is rendered problematic by the twists and turns of his own prose and by his notorious, restless scepticism".

This difficulty, however, cannot be attributed entirely to the problem which has been brought about through different interpretations, but can be seen as one which is inherent in Nietzsche's own writings. As Berkowitz (1995) points out, "Although he argues that morality is an outgrowth or projection of desire and will, he also invokes justice as the rarest of virtues, that which governs the service of truth, giving and receiving, and valid legislation. Although he affirms in unequivocal terms that nature is non-moral, chaotic, and senseless, he appeals to nature as a moral or ethical standard". Because of this kind of dual attitude on

justice, nature and so on, Nietzsche has been often accused that there is a pervasive tension between his understanding of nature and that of humans, which might be recognized by Nietzsche himself. Thus, Conway (1995, p.49) argues that "viewed as a moment within the career of an individual philosopher, Nietzsche's 'return to Nature' appears to be a failure. Despite his enormous success in dispensing with metaphysical principles of explanation, he fails in the end to subject *himself* to the naturalistic categories that he unflinchingly applies to other philosophers". From this standpoint, I will discuss both some implications and limitations of Nietzsche's naturalistic ethics for theory of environmental justice.

2. Nietzsche's critique of anti-naturalism and task for naturalistic ethics

Naturalism or naturalistic ethics can be seen as "a system that seeks to establish its principles on the laws of nature, that considers first of all not what ought to be the nature of man, but what is" (Spencer, 1931, p.67), or as "a view which simply limits itself to what is natural or normal in its explanations, as against appeal to what transcends nature as a whole, or is in any way supernatural or mystical" (Kaufmann, 1950, p.81). From this point of view, Nietzsche's philosophy might fairly be characterized as naturalistic, which is radically different from Kant and Hegel. Indeed, while characterizing the "development of pessimism into nihilism" as "denaturalization of value" (WP 37), Nietzsche asserts that his "fundamental innovation" in this area is the "naturalization of morality" (WP 462) or the "naturalization of humanity" (GS 109). Indeed, throughout his work, his task was to develop a comprehensive naturalistic conception of value and to re-evaluate all existing values in light of it, which seems to formulate a new foundation for so-called

postmodern ecology (cf. Gare, 1995; Conley, 1997).

Nietzsche's naturalist philosophy was developed in three kinds of the contexts which he criticized; that is, Christianity, Cartesian philosophy and modern physics, and traditions of naturalist philosophy itself.

It is well known that Nietzsche railed against Christianity for radically divorcing human beings from the natural world, and the soul or spirit from the body or flesh, holding the latter in contempt. In Christian morality, Nietzsche writes, "it is the lack of nature, it is the utterly gruesome fact that *antinature* itself received the highest honors and was fixed over humanity as law and categorical imperative" (EH 'Why I am destiny' 7). The underestimation or lack of nature and the identification of *antinature* as the highest value in Christian morality lead to a Christian doctrine that "the fact of suffering in life means primarily that life is not just, that it is even essentially unjust" (Deleuze, 1983, p.15), and hence one needs *antinatural* or 'otherworldly' justice for eternal life (GM I 14,15). In this context, Nietzsche poses following questions; "When will all these shadows of God cease to darken our minds? When will we complete our de-deification of nature? When may we begin to '*naturalize*' humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?" (GS 109).

Another source of Nietzsche's naturalism is his critique of Cartesian dichotomy between nature and humanity, and of modern physics. In order to see a genealogy of 'nihilism', which might imply such a dichotomy between object and subject, between nature and culture, between body and mind, between animal and human, etc., Nietzsche often traced critically back through Hegel and Kant to Plato and Socrates. It is Descartes, however, who says that nature in its most general aspect means God himself, or the ordered system of created things established by God, in which there is in it no differentiation of good or bad, beneficial or

harmful. His talk of nature here evokes a passivity of the mind which seems at odds with the ideal of the mastery of nature. "The problem of nihilism, pervasive of all strata of society," thus, "cannot even be correctly stated unless it is recognized as the failure of modern [Cartesian] syncretic philosophy which believed it possible to undertake the care of humanity through the mastery of nature" (Kennington, 1978, p.223)³⁾.

Nietzsche was more hostile to modern physics and politics which was influenced from the former. That is, as Lampert (1993, p.414) understands, "in its lack of reverence for nature, modern physics serves modern politics ... Modern democratic humanism elevated the human by denigrating nature, and it was aided by a physics that offered the fitting world-interpretation". Not only did modern physicists talk so proudly "nature's conformity to law", but also "the democratic instincts of the modern soul" wanted "everywhere equality before the law; nature ... is no better off than we are" (BGE 22). Thus a purpose of Nietzsche's naturalism is; "To translate man back into nature; to become master over the many vain and overly enthusiastic interpretations and connotations that have so far been scrawled and painted over that eternal basic text of *homo natura*; to see to it that man henceforth stands before man as even today, hardened in the discipline of science, he stands before the *rest* of nature ..." (BGE 230).

Nietzsche was also critical to some aspects of naturalist philosophical traditions which stem from the ancient Greek Stoicism to Rousseau's naturalist political theory. For both the Stoics and Nietzsche, something has value if it is either in accordance with nature or such as to bring about that state of affairs. But the Stoics conceived the essence of nature as rationality which they regarded as the structure of reality, that is, God, and that the good or perfect life is a life in conformity with this structure. Yet Nietzsche considered the essence of nature to be 'will to power', and accused the Stoics

of imposing their ideals, i.e. reason, on nature. Thus Nietzsche argues, “ ‘According to nature’ you want to *live* ? O you noble Stoics, what deceptive worlds these are ! Imagine a being like nature, wasteful beyond measure, indifferent beyond measure, without purposes and consideration, without mercy and justice, fertile and desolate and uncertain at the same time” (BGE 9). Nietzsche also opposed his aim of ‘translating man back into nature’ to Rousseau’s longing for ‘return to nature’ . Rousseau’s concept of nature, in Nietzsche’s view, was an “attempt to read moral Christian ‘humanity’ into nature ... as if ‘nature’ was freedom, goodness, innocence, fairness, justice, and idylls ...” (WP, 340). While Rousseau’s concept of nature desired to restore an ideal Christian state of affairs⁴), his own concept of nature into which he wished to translate man has nothing to do with these characteristics.

Thus, in a critique of this kind of naturalistic tradition, Nietzsche declares, “My Mission: the dehumanization of nature and then the naturalization of the human after it has gained the pure concept of nature” (Nietzsche, cited in Lampert, 1993, p.278). Nietzsche’s concepts of nature and of humans can be seen as an attempt to destruct the humanization of nature - both a shadow of dead gods and a result of the imperative of modern philosophy, physics, and politics - and thereby to provide a ground for the (re-) naturalization of nature (and of humans). Nietzsche’s destructive work is well known than the other, constructive part of his work, as he left a great legacy to contemporary poststructuralist philosophers. Moreover, now “ Nietzsche’s thought” is well conceived as “a post-Baconian naturalism, a complete immanentism affirming the natural order, an ecological philosophy dubbed ‘joyous science’ by Nietzsche” (Lampert, 1993, p.278). But it is still questionable whether his groundwork for philosophy that affirms the natural order as it is has succeeded or not.

3. Nature and humans in Nietzsche’s ecology

1) Naturalization of nature

Nietzsche, as we usually do, often used the term ‘nature’ to refer to the realm of living creatures and other natural elements. When Nietzsche asserted, for instance, that modern thought accorded human being a “false order of rank in relations to animals and nature” (GS 115), he meant, in the first place, that human being is just another living creature, in essence the same as any others. But Nietzsche also used this term in a wider context to consider something related to more or less abstract characters of nature. For example, when he criticized the Stoic doctrine of ‘according to nature’ , he means a morality which the Stoics imposed on nature (BGE 9). In a similar vein, Nietzsche himself appears to give nature new meanings, as he wants to teach us that “Let your will say: the overman *shall be* the meaning of the earth! I beseech you, my brothers, *remain faithful to the earth*, and do not believe those who speak to you of otherworldly hopes” (Za P)⁵).

Even though both concepts of nature are important and intermingled in Nietzsche’s naturalism, we need to see some key aspects which he emphasized in his writings to meet the demand to naturalize nature. In his early work, as written in *Schopenhauer as Educator*, Nietzsche expects nature as its ‘universal utility’ to preside over the timely production of philosophers and artists as exemplary human beings. Thus he writes, “Nature wants always to be of universal utility, but it does not know how to find the best and most suitable means and instruments for this end ... That nature has wanted to make existence explicable and significant to man through the production of the philosopher and the artist is, given nature’s own desire for redemption, certain” (SE 7). But in Nietzsche’s view, nature fails to do so, as he continues that “yet how uncertain, how dull and

feeble is the effect it generally achieves with the philosophers and artists !". This is because, according to him, nature has been used "extravagantly in the domain of culture" as well as in that of economy, and hence it sacrifices too much energy, and hence becomes "a bad economist" (SE 7).

Nietzsche in these passages understands nature in a utilitarian view which has double perspectives, both of which might have a relation to Spencer's concept of 'utility', espoused in the sense that "the concept 'good' is essentially identical with the concept 'useful', 'practical'" (GM I 3). From one perspective, nature is seen as a (or the) source or producer of 'useful' human beings, even though "it fails to achieve its objective and most philosophers fail to become universally useful" (SE 7). Nature, from another perspective, may be used as means or instruments of both economical and cultural development. According to Nietzsche, these two kinds of nature are mutually exclusive and even contradictory (Conway, 1997, pp.13-14).

Nietzsche's concept of nature, his account for the naturalization of nature, becomes much more complicated in his later (post-Zarathustran) period, so that it has led very different and highly controversial interpretations. Thus, for instance, Hallman (1991, pp.110-111), who understands Nietzsche as a prototypical deep ecologist, argues that "Nietzsche's early views on the proper relationship of humanity to nature are most fully described, although not with utmost clarity. ... However, in his later writings, Nietzsche moves decidedly closer to the standpoint of deep ecology". But in his critique of Hallman's interpretation, Acampora (1994, p.188) insists that "Nietzsche is *not* a 'biospheric egalitarian' but rather an aristocratically individualistic highhumanist ... [in particular] the figural dominance of the *Übermensch* in Nietzsche's later writings (i.e. *Zarathustra* and after) ... lends large credence to viewing Nietzsche as an aristocratic

individualist over and against viewing him as a biospheric egalitarian".

I do not want to judge which interpretation is correct or right for Nietzsche. But there are, I think, as pointed out by Schatzki (1994, p.151), Berkowitz (1995, p.4) and others, a certain ambiguity in his concepts of nature and of humanity, and tension between them. Especially, according to Conway's (1995, p.32) interpretation, "In his post-Zarathustran writings, Nietzsche investigates the (apparent) tension between Life and Nature, which reproduces in naturalistic terms the original opposition between Apollo and Dionysus. Having abandoned the 'artists' metaphysics' of *The Birth of Tragedy*, he transforms the aesthetic categories eponymously associated with Dionysus and Apollo into the economic principles of Nature and Life, respectively". Nietzsche, however, could not resolve the tension between them even in his later work. Before reaching this kind of conclusion, we need to see how Nietzsche attempts to dehumanize or naturalize nature, and to place humans back in this nature.

To naturalize nature, Nietzsche attempts first of all to remove supernatural and moral characters from nature which have been imposed by Christianity and modern philosophy, physics and politics. In his post-Zarathustran writings, Nietzsche rejects more explicitly the dichotomy between humanity and nature, criticizing Western philosophy and religion for being anthropocentric, for denaturalizing nature. Instead, Nietzsche suggests a naturalized nature, a 'de-deified' one, which God or reason does not organize, which does not pursue purposes, and which in itself lacks morality (GS 344, 363). Nature is unbounded, independent of and indifferent to the peculiar needs and demands of human life. Nature thus needs not, and does not, regulate itself in accordance with any super-natural laws that might favor or frustrate specific forms of human life. Human life, on the contrary, needs to be "more

natural” in a sense that “It does not aspire to virtue, and for that we respect nature” (WP 120).

Nature, once has been removed the moral or super-natural qualities, is seen as a perfect whole as such or complete force, that is, what Nietzsche calls ‘will to power’. In his relatively early writing, *Schopenhauer as Educator*, for example, Nietzsche argues that “it is the fundamental idea of culture ... to promote the production of the philosopher, the artist, and the saint within us and without us and thereby to work at the perfecting of nature” (SE 5). Nietzsche here seems to argue that in order to correct for the profligacy of nature and hence to work at the perfecting of nature, culture must ensure the conditions for the emergence of great human beings. But Nietzsche in his Post-Zarathustran writings attempts to overcome this kind of anthropocentric argument in his early work. Thus, in the very midst of his presentation of morality in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche presents his own view of nature as ‘will to power’ (here ‘power’ means “creation of the world” or “the *causa prima*” (first cause)) (BGE 9).

What is more, Nietzsche’s presentation of nature as the will to power has a relationship with his principle of cosmos or of nature, that is, what he calls the ‘eternal return’. Once again, according to Deleuze (1983, pp.47-8), we can see the eternal return as “the affirmation of necessity of cosmos [or nature]”, and “as the expression of a principle which serves as an explanation of diversity and its reproduction [of nature], of difference and its repetition [in nature]”. ‘Returning’ here is the being of that which becomes. “That *everything* recurs is the closest *approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being* - high point of the meditation” (WP 617). Nietzsche’s account of the eternal return denies the terminal or equilibrium state of nature, and presupposes “not some one and same thing which returns but rather returning itself is the one thing which is affirmed of diversity or multiplicity”. If Nietzsche’s task ‘to translate

man back into nature’ or his talk of ‘returning to nature’ can be interpreted in relation to his accounts of the will to power and of the eternal return, it can be said that humans need the ‘eternal’ return to nature as the synthesis of divergent forces.

From the above interpretations of Nietzsche’s attempt to naturalize nature, we can draw out some important points which would give deep insights for contemporary ecology (cf. Hallmen, 1991, pp.100-1). (1) Super-natural (i.e. transcendental) or moral (i.e. anti-natural) characters have to be removed from nature, which has been imposed by Western religions and modern philosophy, physics and politics; (2) Nature, instead, can be seen as a perfect whole as such or complete force, that is, what Nietzsche calls ‘will to power’, as a genealogical whole or synthesis of forces, which are differential and genetic; (3) Nature (or cosmos) can be seen as the expression of the eternal return which serves as an explanation of diversity and its reproduction, of difference and its repetition, and humans need the ‘eternal’ return to nature as the synthesis of divergent forces.

Yet what is problematic in Nietzsche’s attempt to naturalize nature is that, once removed both God and human rationality from nature, Nietzsche himself tries to reevaluate nature. “I too speak of a ‘return to nature’, although it is really not a going back but an *ascent* - up into the high, free, even terrible Nature and naturalness where great tasks are something one plays with, one *may* play with” (TI, “Skirmishes of an untimely man”, 48). What is more, Nietzsche’s speaking of a ‘return to nature’ as an *ascent* has a close relationship with what he calls overman. What Nietzsche lets Zarathustra speak again and again is that “Behold, I teach you the overman. The overman is the meaning of the earth” (Za P). This apothegm which appears first in the ‘Prologue’, recurs throughout *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* can be seen in the context of criticizing traditional Western thinking for being antinatural,

for failing to 'remain faithful to the earth'.

But, here we need to ask, against Nietzsche: why and how do we remain faithful to the earth? Indeed, while accusing the Stoics of imposing their ideal, i.e. reason, Nietzsche attempts to give nature new meanings (such as the will to power, and the eternal return). Nietzsche's own account of nature can be seen as an act of "the most spiritual will to power" (BGE 9). But how can such act be justified? Moreover, for Nietzsche, 'the remaining faithful to the earth' or 'returning to nature' appears to be possible only for overman such as Napoleon and Goethe. Why are the labors of 'ordinary' human beings, what he calls the 'all-too-human' insufficient to return to nature, and hence to warrant the future of nature and the species?

2) Placing humans back into nature

One of the most important implications in Nietzsche's naturalism is that it wants to place man back into nature. According to him, Greek thought had separated animals and human beings by ascribing reason to people while withholding it from animals. Christian thought achieved the same result by outfitting people with a soul and a free will that separated them from the beasts. In Nietzsche's eyes, both views accorded man a "false order of rank in relations to animals and nature" (GS 115). Neither souls nor free wills elevate man above the animals, over the rest of nature. For these properties do not exist, and reason is just as much a product of evolution as are animal faculties. Thus, Nietzsche, especially in his later work to translate man back into nature, wrote of the place of humanity in nature: "Man, a little, eccentric species of animals, which - fortunately - has its day; all on earth a mere moment, an incident, an exception without consequences, something of no importance to the general character of the earth" (WP 303).

In order for human being to overcome this situation, Nietzsche suggested two notions that came to figure importantly in his later writings:

those of will to power and of the overman. That is, Nietzsche's naturalism to place man back into a naturalized nature can be conceived essentially as a will to and struggle for power. The will to power, if properly understood, is a disposition to effect a creatively transformative consequence on earth. For Nietzsche, the overman is the apotheosis of this fundamental disposition. We examine first how Nietzsche understands and characterizes man in relation to animals among living creatures, and then try to see Nietzsche's concept of humanity in terms of the will to power and overman. In doing so, we want to point out some limitations in his attempt to place man back into nature.

Nietzsche's attitude to animals in his early work seems to be sympathetic, as he writes that "More profoundly feeling people have at all times felt sympathy for the animals because they suffer from life and yet do not possess the power to turn the goal of life against themselves and understand their existence metaphysically; one is, indeed, profoundly indignant at the sight of senseless suffering" (SE 5). Because of this senseless suffering of animals, its body is often conceived as a container of the guilt-laden souls of men, which "acquires meaning and significance as punishment and atonement before the seat of eternal justice". Yet when we reflect ourselves - with a question, "where does the animal cease, where does man begin?" - we recognize that "usually we fail to emerge out of animality, we ourselves are the animals whose suffering seems to be senseless" (SE 5).

Nietzsche, however, continues that "But there are moments *when we realize this* [emerging out of animality]". For Nietzsche, the difference between humans and other animals does not merely consist in reflection, self-consciousness, reason, etc. but in the 'moments' when the difference is comprehended and man becomes something that stands high above us. Moreover, this differential moments are possible only with the help of "those true *men*, those

who are no longer animal, the philosophers, artists and saints" (SE 5). It is without doubt that Nietzsche from his early writings is concerned with a certain ability of humanity, which makes humans different from animals. Although he neither removes human beings in the world from the natural realm nor denies human animality, he does recognize and positively value the humanity of some human individuals with a "power to turn the goal of life against themselves and understand their existence metaphysically". This power can help ordinary men to emerge momentarily out of animality.

In his later work, Nietzsche takes humanity in relation to animals into account more seriously. Nietzsche, for instance, opens the second essay of *Genealogy of Morals* with a question: "To breed an animal with the right to make promises - is not this the paradoxical task that nature has set itself in the case of man? is it not the real problem regarding man?" (GM II 1). In order to answer to this question, his discussion of promising, punishment, bad conscience, etc. looks like a naturalistic account of certain features of ourselves that distinguish us from mere beasts. Nietzsche here would be trying to debunk the traditional idea that human beings are essentially different from the beasts. On the other hand, however, Nietzsche is also concerned in this essay to make clear the sort of creatures he thinks we are. In his estimation, we are after all very different from the other beasts.

Thus Nietzsche says, "If we place ourselves at the end of th[e] tremendous process, where the tree at last brings forth fruit, where society and the morality of custom at last reveal what they have simply been the means to: then we discover that the ripest fruit is the *sovereign individual*, like only to himself, liberated again from morality of custom, autonomous and supramoral" (GM II 2). What Nietzsche wants to express, that is, what makes man "th[e] emancipated individual, with the actual right to make promises, th[e] master of a free will, th[e] sovereign man" would be 'reason'. That is, as

Havas (1995, p.195) understands in relation to this expression, "although what sets us apart from the other animals - namely, our reason - is in fact merely a feature of our own animality... Nietzsche wants to emphasize that our reason does nevertheless - or anyway ought to - distinguish us from our four-footed cousins".

Nietzsche, might be the last man among those who argues for human nature in relation to reason. Traditionally, human nature has been understood in terms of man's rationality and capacity for moral agency. But for Nietzsche, what has been described as the essence of man is really will to power. The conception of human nature as will to power leads Nietzsche to agree with Hobbes' or Darwin's view that the natural human condition is one of conflict, a 'war of all against all'. However, unlike such views, Nietzsche does not conceive this primitive condition to be governed by any natural or divine law, a law that dictates to man what is right and just⁶). On the contrary, man in his natural condition is a 'wild, free and prowling animal' in the sense that his nature does not dictate any specific goals that he should pursue nor does nature constrain him to fulfill any pre-ordained ends. Man is by nature a self-determining animal, the 'animal that is as yet undetermined'. But, what do the will to power and overman actually mean, especially when it is related to humanity?

In his early writings such as *Birth of Tragedy* and *Schopenhauer as Educator*, neither "will to power" nor 'overman' makes an appearance. The relation between nature and life is discussed in other aesthetic terms, especially Apollo and Dionysus, which can be associated with 'artist' (life) and 'work of art' (or nature) respectively. But Nietzsche refers constantly to 'nature herself' as 'artistic' and terms both the Apollonian and the Dionysian tendencies 'art-impulses' of nature (Schacht, 1995, 133-135). Yet as Conway argues (1995, pp.35-37), there is a tension between Apollo and Dionysus, between life and nature. That is,

"Dionysus ... represents the indestructibility of Life, but Life is indestructible only as a transient subsystem within the boundless economy of Nature. To become a disciple of Dionysus thus requires one to pursue a strict, thoroughgoing naturalism. A genuine justification of human existence ... must regard Life *as it is*, as fully natural, as bearing no transcendent meaning, or beauty what so ever". But in Nietzsche's work, "Apollo and Life may appear to constitute forces independent of Dionysus and Nature, respectively", but "their independence from the latter, monistic forces is only illusory".

In *Schopenhauer as Educator*, Nietzsche's idea of will to power may be interpreted in either of two ways. In the first place it may be interpreted in terms of biology, that is, in terms of animal power; secondly in metaphysical terms, in the sense of power of controlling the goal of life, which the artist possesses. As we have seen above, Nietzsche vacillates between these two points of view. That is, for Nietzsche, the placement of man back into nature is to reject the belief that human beings occupy privileged positions within nature or especially in comparison with animals, which stemmed from human arrogance, i.e. artificial reason. But on the other hand, Nietzsche from his early work does recognize and positively value humanity, even though he neither removes human beings in the world from the realm of the natural nor devalues human animality. Nietzsche attributes such a humanity to artists, philosophers and saints among others.

In his later work, Nietzsche does no longer explicate nature and life in terms of the aesthetic principles or justification that he associates with Dionysus and Apollo, respectively. Nietzsche now tends to superimpose on the naturalistic basis an interpretation of the will to power which is not altogether reconcilable with its basis. Nietzsche's critique of man and his activity on nature in the tradition of nihilism becomes more severe. He

expresses resentment and bad conscience as inherent in the humanity of man, and thus nihilism is the *a priori* concept of universal history of man. Nietzsche's critique of nihilism or of modernity is not directed against an accidental property of man, but against his very essence. The essence of man and of the world occupied by man is the becoming reactive of all forces, that is, nihilism (Deleuze, 1983, pp.166-7). Man and his generic activity are thus seen as the two skin-diseases of the Earth " "The earth' ... 'has a skin, and this skin has diseases. One of these diseases, for example, is called 'man'. and another one of these diseases is called 'fire hound' " (Za II 'On Great Events').

Indeed, Nietzsche's formulation of the byword of nihilism is: "Everything lacks meaning" (WP 1). But this byword is certainly not his own understanding: "Now that the shabby origin of [traditional] values is becoming clear" he says, "the universe [i.e. nature] seems to have lost value, seems 'meaningless' - but that is only a *transitional stage*" (WP 7). His own pronouncement, which is spoken by Zarathustra, is very different: "Behold, I teach you the overman. The overman is the meaning of the earth" (Za P). For Nietzsche, the earth have a meaning - a meaning deriving from the value he takes to be associated with the realization of the ideal or of symbol of the overman as a "union of spiritual superiority with well-being and an excess of strength" (Schacht, 1995, 53). What is more, now, like the earth, man on the earth also comes to have a meaning. The overman is to be construed as a symbol of human life raised to the level of art, in which crude self-assertive struggle is sublimated into creativity. Nietzsche also speaks of higher man, a man approximating to his ideal of overman, who represents the emergence of a new 'artistic' humanity. Both overman and higher man can be seen as characterizing the meaning of humanity oriented towards the earth as well as art.

In the above consideration, it is obvious that for Nietzsche the will to power cannot presuppose any definite content, independently of the arbitrary wills or reason of humans. Of course, the will to power is properly understood only if it is conceived as a disposition of proceeding from the perspectival stipulation of values, and of effecting a creatively transformative self-overcoming, the disposition which Nietzsche attributes to the overman. Nietzsche considers the creativity of overman as no longer subject to the demands and limitations associated with the 'human, all-too-human', in order to remove the traditional concept of reason. But Nietzsche also speaks of the overman or higher man to consider the capability of humanity and its meaning. What is more, as we shall see later, as higher man is characterized as a type of the master or the strong who can oppose the slave, or the weak. The will to power comes to be represented best in the strong and courageous individual. Yet it seems to me that the sense in which this type of ethics demands 'life and ever more life' is distinctly different from the sense which the naturalistic ethics promotes.

4. From metaphysical justice to naturalist justice.

Nietzsche's naturalism can be seen as an attempt to trace the genealogy of the Western morality (back to Socrates and Plato, and to Greek Gods), and to go beyond its limits, 'beyond good and evil'. In this sense, Nietzsche himself claims to be the first philosopher ever to have treated 'morality as a problem'. For Nietzsche, every system of norms aspires to be the ruling system, regardless of the contents and nature of its value. That is, like Marx, Nietzsche understands that political legitimacy can only be seen in terms of dominant powers, not conformity to principles of morality or justice (Love, 1987, p.10). Yet Nietzsche

understands the notion of morality more broadly than Marx, indeed: that is, for Nietzsche, 'morality' can be understood as whatever gives voice or meaning to the philosophical demand for reasons. In this sense, his attack on morality shows that our moral values answer to nothing in the world itself, but rather reflect only our own human, all too human. But on the other hand, Nietzsche defends or presupposes a particular type of morality. "It is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally *justified*" (BT 5, 24). Even though Nietzsche could not mean by 'aesthetic justification', a justification that somehow competes with the Socratic or 'metaphysical' justification based on reason and authority, the way that makes sense of speaking the aesthetic matter is to recognize the meaning of the earth or naturalistic ethics.

In this and next sections, we focus on the concept of justice in Nietzsche's naturalistic ethics, to see the way that he treated 'morality as a problem', that is, the way turning from 'metaphysical' justice to 'naturalist' justice. Nietzsche's critique of traditional morality and justice and his way toward naturalist ethics and in particular naturalist concept of justice would provide a new ground on which we can theorize environmental justice. Indeed, theory of environmental justice becomes an important issue in recent intellectual and practical reflections on current environmental crisis, both from liberal (cf. Wenz, 1996) and Marxist perspective (cf. Harvey, 1996). A theory of environmental justice, drawn from Nietzsche's naturalistic ethics, can be seen as a third alternative perspective that would have a powerful influence upon change in our environmental attitude to nature as well as humans.

But his treatment of justice, like that of nature and humanity, is ambivalent: "All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both. That is your world! A world indeed!" (BT 9). Indeed, Some interpreters who are interested in Nietzsche's

treatment of justice say that "Justice lies at the heart of Nietzsche's work but as something more than condemnation and punishment: justice is giving things their due" (Lampert, 1993, p.289). According to Andrew (1995, pp.160-1), "Nietzsche is best known for his theory that demands for justice are usually nothing more than expression of servile resentment against the powerful, but he also conceived of justice less negatively, as a broad or comprehensive perspective beyond the servile horizons of goods and evil". We first examine Nietzsche's critique of metaphysical concept of justice, and his attempt to turn it to naturalist foundation.

As his whole thought is drawn from a critique of Western religion, metaphysics and modern philosophy and politics, Nietzsche's treatment of justice can be seen in relation to his critique of religious and metaphysical conception and application of justice. In Nietzsche's view, Christianity understands that the fact of suffering in life in this world means primarily that life itself is essentially unjust, that it pays for an essential injustice by suffering, and that the result of this is that life must be justified, that is to say, redeemed of it injustice or saved by God. Thus it may be said by Christianity that "We good man - *we are the just* - what they desire they call, not retaliation, but 'the triumph of *justice*' ... the victory of God, of the *just* God, over the godless" (GM I 14). For Christianity, justice is only in the kingdom of God, and God manages the good and just on earth. (cf. GM III 18).

Nietzsche also denies any claims for justice in legal and political terms, the claim that " 'Just' and 'unjust' exist, accordingly, only after the institution of the law." For in his view, "to speak of just or unjust *in itself* is quite senseless; in itself, of course, no injury, assault, exploitation, destruction can be 'unjust', since life operates *essentially* .. through injury, assault, exploitation, destruction" (GM II 11). Traditionally, philosophers since Plato have pursued the ideal of justice in relation to rational

capacity of judgment, or to access to human essence or being of beings. In a similar vein, political theorists have derived the notions of 'justice', 'rights' and moral obligations from either the rational nature of man or from natural law. They approached the problems of justice by constructing models of a universally just social order and by searching for 'objective' principles by which to evaluate all political regimes. But in Nietzsche's view, this kind of justice is only an obstacle to self-overcoming, which prevents men of knowledge from reading his own works in the right way, or an instrument to legitimate an existing political order.

Nietzsche recognizes affirmatively that humans establish equivalents when they create moralities: "Everything has its price: all things can be paid for" is the "oldest and naivest moral canon of *justice*. ... justice on this elementary level is the good will among parties of approximately equal power to come to terms with one another, to reach an 'understanding' by means of a settlement - and to *compel* parties of lesser power to reach a settlement among themselves" (GM II 8). He draws the line, however, at liberal-democratic principles of justice, because the liberal democrats' principle of equal right subsumes qualitatively different individuals under a common standard. "The doctrine of equality ! There is no more poisonous poison anywhere: for it seems to be preached by justice itself, whereas it really is the termination of justice. 'Equal to the equal, unequal to the unequal' - *that* would be the true slogan of justice; and also its corollary: 'Never make equal what is unequal' " (TI, "Skirmishes of an untimely man", 48). Beneath its equivalent form lies the inequality of herd morality. Nietzsche fears that " 'equality of rights' could all too easily be changed into equality in violating rights" (BGE 212).

Against these kinds of treatment of justice, Nietzsche's philosophy of beyond good and evil, brings with it a new conception of justice. "They need a new *justice!*. And a new watchword! and

new philosophers! The moral earth too is round! The moral earth too has its antipodes! The antipodes too have a right to exist! There is another new world to discover! - and more than one! On board ship, philosophers!" (GS 289) Nietzsche's notion of justice plays a crucial role in his self-assumed guise as the disciple of Dionysus and the teacher of the circle, of the ring of recurrence. (Ansell-Pearson, 1993). Nietzsche's conception of justice is a peculiar one: it is neither restricted to its legal context nor to its moral meaning. Instead his idea of justice constitutes an aesthetic judgment of the world (in his early work), or the naturalist principle of will to power and overman (in his later work).

According to Nietzsche in his early work, life and its activity are justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon: "for it is only as an *aesthetic phenomenon* that existence and the world are eternally justified" (BT 5, 24). For Nietzsche, as he describes in his 1886 preface to *The Birth of Tragedy*, "art, and *not* morality, is presented as the truly *metaphysical* activity of man" (BT AS 5). That is, life is justified only by 'a metaphysics of art', not of morality. But Nietzsche in this preface repudiates the "*art of metaphysical comfort*", because he thinks now that it would only reinforce the anti-naturalism of Christianity. Instead, Nietzsche recommends to his reader that "No ! You ought to learn the art of *thisworldly* comfort first;... you may some day dispatch all metaphysical comforts to the devil" (BT, AS 7). That is, the key to a justification of existence lies not in the 'metaphysical comfort' engendered by the union of Apollo and Dionysus, but in the 'this-worldly' comfort in negotiation of exchange between life and nature⁷.

It seems likely that Nietzsche writes his post-Zarathustran work in this anti-metaphysical tenor, even though the recommended 'art of thisworldly comfort' comprises some strain of naturalism. Thus the concept of justice also can be seen in terms of *this-worldly* comfort. To see Nietzsche's concept

of justice as a this-worldly perspective on life is to comprehend life beyond the moral valuation of good and evil, and beyond the standpoint of metaphysics upon which Heidegger wanted to see Nietzsche's notion of justice (cf. Heidegger, vol.3. pp.137-50). Even though it can be argued that Nietzsche could not go beyond this metaphysical standpoint, we can accept for a moment that Nietzsche justifies life not in metaphysical terms of its realization and completion in a ideal being of beings, but in terms of 'this world as the actually-achieved highest possible ideal' (WP 1019), or in other words, the ideal of living in accordance with nature, which is the deepest thought animating Nietzsche's naturalist ethics.

What does the ideal of living in accordance with the nature mean? Criticizing the Stoic argument for life 'according to nature' (BGE 9), Nietzsche describes his own position on the ideal of human essence or perfectability, that is will to power. Nietzsche does not bring either moral judgement or a moral ideal to bear on his comprehension of life. The will to power is, for Nietzsche, the only possible 'law of life' and that 'law' is *supra-moral*. Nietzsche's notion of the will to power culminates in the rejection of the universal validity of all systems of norms which are justified on the basis of metaphysical being or human rationality on the one hand, and in the affirmation of the perspectival character which brings about the highest realization of life itself, on the other. Thus while Nietzsche's treatment of justice can be seen as a radically critical project of modernity, it does not in the final analysis affirm the legitimacy or illegitimacy of any moral concepts. Rather it goes beyond metaphysical morality of good and evil.

But what is problematic in his conception of justice is that Nietzsche's notion of the will to power which can be regarded as a fundamental principle for justice is still metaphysical (metaphysics taken in a sense of denoting the being of beings). According to Deleuze (1983, p.50), "The

will to power cannot be separated from force without falling into metaphysical abstraction”⁸). Moreover, even though his philosophy of the will to power does not repudiate all traditional systems of ethics, his affirmation of the highest realization of life with the perspectival character terminates with the doctrine of the ‘new aristocracy’.

Indeed, Nietzsche writes that “We are all seeking conditions *which are emancipated from the bourgeois, and to a greater degree from the priestly, notion of morality*” (WP 119). But Nietzsche’s notion of will to power has a certain controversial issue which would be easily interpreted as justifying exploitation or domination of other humans and of nature. Thus for instance, according to Hallman (1991, p.117), the ethical implication of Nietzsche’s deeply biospherical egalitarianism is that his “philosophy opens the way for a *nonexploitative* relationship of human beings with nature”. But in Acampora’s view (1994, p.189), “for Nietzsche explicitly and forcefully defines *life* as ‘will to power’ and *will to power* as exploitation”. In other words, Zarathustran metaphysics of will to power seems to lead us a conception of justice for ‘master morality’, which can be counterposed by other spokesmen for the ‘slave morality’, other prophets of social justice against oppression and exploitation of the poor by the privileged classes (Zeitlin, 1994, p.167).

5. Environmental justice in naturalist ethics.

1) Nietzsche’s naturalist conception of justice.

Now we can clarify some important implications of Nietzsche’s notion of justice. Some of its implications can be seen as ideas which conceptualize immediately environmental justice. It is not to say that Nietzsche mentions about ‘environ-

mental justice’ which has been often defined as a moral attitude of humans towards nature, or as a moral relation between humans and nature or the rests of nature. But Nietzsche’s conception of justice as ‘highest representative of life itself’ implies the ideal of living in accordance with nature, and hence has a significance for theory of environmental justice. What is more, the other implications of his notion of justice would be applicable to, and give a deeper insight for, theory of environmental justice than any other contemporary eco-philosophers. We discuss first some general implications of Nietzsche’s notion of justice.

In Nietzsche’s account, justice has nothing to do with morality, rather it goes beyond morality of good and evil. But it is precisely justice which otherwise is supposed to be the ethical *par excellence*, that overcomes all kinds of traditional morality. We can find this ethical *par excellence* more substantively in another anticipatory definition of justice in *Human All Too Human*:

To be sure, there is also quite another category of genius, that of justice; ... It is its way to avoid with hearty indignation everything which blinds and confuses our judgment about things; thus it is an *enemy of convictions*, for it wants to give to each thing its due, be it living or dead, real or fictive - and to do so it must apprehend it clearly. Therefore it places each thing in the best light and walks all around it with an attentive eye (HAH I 636).

In this passage, Nietzsche consider several important implications of his notion of justice. That is, (1) Justice is a way which leads us to avoid with hearty indignation that blinds and confuses our judgment about things; (2) Justice is an opponent of all convictions, that is, of all rigidity; (3) Justice means giving each his due; (4) That it goes around everything with an attentive eye means that justice does not become fixed in one point of view, but goes through all perspectives.

(1) First of all, we can emphasize that (environmental) justice avoids us to blind and confuse the judgment about things surrounding us.

In this sense we can understand that Nietzsche's account of justice as a particular way of thinking; that is, justice is "constructive, exclusive annihilating way of thinking, out of evaluation: as *the highest representative of life itself*". Thus, the highest (i.e. 'just') man is one "who represented the *antithetical character of existence* most strongly, as the glory and sole justification" (WP. 881). Justice is the perspective of life itself viewed as perpetual self-overcoming, and is the opposite of the view which sees life merely in terms of self-preservation. Yet justice is not only for the value of life: "Life is a unique case; one must justify all existence and not only life - the justifying principle is one that explains life, too" (WP 706).

(2) justice is neither a God nor a law: it can neither be elevated to a convicting God, nor warranted by a rigid law. Such justice becomes an absolute injustice; an act of most intense violence in the realm of religion and that of legality occurs in the name of justice, but against true justice. Nietzsche's notion of justice wants to overcome any concepts of justice based on religious convictions and legal rigidity. "The justice which began with, 'everything is dischargeable, everything must be discharged', ends by winking and letting those incapable of discharging their debt go free: it ends, as does every good thing on earth, by *overcoming itself*. This self-overcoming of justice" (GM 10). Moreover, for Nietzsche, justice relinquishes any beliefs in the fixed religious and moral categories of good and evil. In other words, justice has its essence in hindering rigidification through constant change.

(3) Nietzsche's argument that justice is "to give each his own" seems to have a certain relation with the formal nature of justice: that is, "justice is done when people get what they deserve" (Wenz, 1987, p.23). Yet, we also try to see this argument in relation to his definition of "Justice, as the function of a comprehensive power" (Stambaugh, 1987, pp.147-8). That is, "Nietzsche does not think justice

in terms of something as its opposite at all; rather justice is the origin from which all other things are clarified. ...[thus] Justice is not one pole of the opposition between justice and revenge (or injustice); rather justice contains every opposition *as opposition*. It gives each his own, that is, it does not attempt to negate the opposition, but harnesses it, holding it together in a totality". Nietzsche's notion of justice as something "to give each his own" would have to do with nature, as we shall see below.

(4) Nietzsche rejects the idea of a thing-in-itself, of absolute truth, of absolute value and, hence, of absolute justice. This rejection leads him to a perspectivism of life and to a pluralism of justice. In his preface of *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche add a new question to a cluster of grave questions with which the book burdened itself: "What, seen in the perspective of *life*, is the significance of morality" (BT AS 4). In his later work, Nietzsche explicitly pursues to answer to this question. That is, "there would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspective estimates and appearances" (BGE 34). For Nietzsche, hence, "There is *only* a perspective seeing, only a perspective 'knowing' " (GM III 12). And there would be only a perspective justifying. This might well be called a 'perspectival' justice, as Andrew (1995, p.161) calls it⁹), citing Nietzsche's argument that "To see *many* neighbors and from *many* eyes and from loud personal eyes - is justice" (Nietzsche, cited from Andrew, 1995, p.161). That is, "justice is the willingness to entertain a plurality of perspectives, the repudiation of monist principles of good and evil or of a single standard of truth".

In addition to these general implications of Nietzsche's notion of justice, which would be certainly applicable to conceptualization of environmental justice, we can find some more implications which have explicitly an ecological significance. That is, one important naturalist thrust of Nietzsche's philosophy is to extend an invitation

for us to live in nature, or in accordance with nature. When Nietzsche writes that justice is “to give each his own”, he might mean that justice is ‘to live in nature, or in accordance with nature’. Nietzsche writes:

“Finally one would live among men and with oneself as in *nature*, without praise, reproaches, overzealousness, delighting in many things as in a spectacle that one formerly had only to fear. One would be free of appearance and would no longer feel the goading thought that one was not simply nature, or that one was more than nature” (HAH I 34).

In this passage, living “without praise, reproaches, overzealousness” would be concerned with justice which “avoids us to blind and conduce the judgment about things”; “delighting in many things as in a spectacle” would be seen as what his perspectival justice implies. What is more, we can find two more important implications for conception of (environmental) justice, though Nietzsche expresses them in one phrase that “live among men and with oneself as in *nature*”. One is the implication of ‘live among men and with oneself’, that is, a communal or egalitarian concept of justice; the other is that ‘live ... as in *nature*’, that is, a naturalist concept of justice.

Whether Nietzsche might defend an egalitarian concept of justice or not is a highly controversial issue. Since Heidegger, one of the foremost interpreters of Nietzsche, claimed that his philosophy represents the culmination of metaphysical thinking which is subjectivistic, individualistic, anthropocentric, and aristocratic, Nietzsche’s work has often been interpreted and accused as anti-egalitarian. But some of contemporary writers on Nietzsche, such as Warren (1988, pp.188, 247), Connolly (1988, pp.171-2), and Havas (1995, p.2) wish to add egalitarian values onto Nietzsche, while eliminating his individualistic evaluations or aristocratic estimations. Indeed, Nietzsche explicitly says that “All unity is unity only as organization and

cooperation - just as a human community is a unity - as opposed to an atomistic anarchy, as a pattern of domination that *signifies* a unity, but *is not* a unity” (WP 561). Even though I do not examine further whether Nietzsche’s perspective is egalitarian or individualist, I think that there is a strain in Nietzsche’s work between individual and community, and that Nietzsche’s solution of this strain in terms of hierarchical or aristocratic order is apparently problematic, as we shall see later.

The other implication that can be drawn from the above passage, ‘live ... as in *nature*’ characterizes finally but most decisively Nietzsche’s naturalist concept of justice. But what does idea of ‘living as in nature’ mean? We can find three kinds (or levels) of living (as) in nature, that is, three kinds of life, nature, and their relationship, which are mutually related in Nietzsche’s conception, but which can be separated analytical.

(1) On the first, a life in nature is one that “affirms what is nature in us” (WP 916). According to Schatzki (1994, pp.152-7), “this ‘nature in us’ consists, among other things, of instincts and inclinations, the body, sexuality, and, as a precondition of growth, severe self-regard”. In this sense, Nietzsche writes that “Every naturalism in morality - that is, every healthy morality - is dominated by an instinct of life ... *Anti-natural morality* - that is, almost every morality which has so far been taught, revered, and preached - turns, conversely *against* the instincts of life” (TI, *Morality as Anti-Nature*, 4). These and other characteristics can be summed up by the idea that “nature in man is the animal in man”. Thus, at this level, by measuring value of values (such as health, impoverishment, etc) according to whether they heightened or depressed life, Nietzsche adopts biophysiological standards. Yet, Nietzsche’s use of biophysiological standards of value is based on deeper ideas concerning natural and human essence.

(2) At the second and higher level, living (as) in

nature prescribes the demand to naturalize man, which is correlative with the demand to de-deify and dehumanize nature. Just as nature is situated beyond good and evil and conceived as amoral, humans exist beyond good and evil and exemplify as far as possible this amoral nature of which they are a part, without dressing nature up in 'moral costumes'. "A man as he *ought* to be: that sounds to us as insipid as 'a tree as it ought to be'" (WP 332). Thus, at this level, humans (or 'higher man'), when contemplating action and appraising states of affairs, place itself into the 'natural (or cosmic) context' and adopt the 'great natural relations' as its standard (Kaulbach, 1982, pp.462-466). This context, in Nietzsche's view, is the perspective of the eternal return which acknowledges the necessities of nature, and at the same time through which man frees himself from nature. Indeed, one of Zarathustra's dominant concerns is that we must learn to live on earth and love earthly existence, while seeking no longer to escape from nature.

(3) At the third, and highest level, living (as) in nature prescribes an ideal of human perfectability, or 'highest representative of life itself'. The ideal of the life most in accordance with the essence of life and nature (that is, will to power) directly reflects Nietzsche's notion of justice, which is not only a function of power, but also the highest representative of life itself. That is, for Nietzsche, "justice" is defined "as a building, an excluding, negating way of thinking [and of living] in terms of valuing: *highest representative of life itself*" (Stambaugh, 1987, p.151). The highest realization of life itself, or human perfection, which is made possible by justice, consists in living in a way most exemplary of will to power; and Nietzsche's expression for the person who lives this way is 'overman'. Ultimately, at this highest level, Nietzsche measures the value of living in nature according to whether they advance or retard the highest representative of life itself at its standard.

2) Limits to Nietzsche's naturalist conception of justice.

In Nietzsche's naturalist ethics, justice is finally elevated to the highest rank; it is constituted of the highest and rarest virtues. Because they are themselves highest and rarest, nothing beyond them can give them warrant. The highest and most powerful men, therefore, are those whose love of earthly existence serves their pure will to justice, that is, 'mercy', accompanied in only the rarest cases by the strength to actually *be* just (Lampert, 1993, p.290). That is, for Nietzsche, "one knows the beautiful name it [justice] has given itself - *mercy*; it goes without saying that mercy remains the privilege of the most powerful man, or better, his - beyond the law" (GM 10). But what is problematic in Nietzsche's conception of justice is that while he speaks of a justice grander than the application of some already present code of just and unjust, human justice itself is inevitably limited to his insight, and bound to be unjust. That is, Nietzsche himself describes that "however much he may strive after justice he is bound, according to the human limitations of his insight, to be unjust" (SE 4).

In this sense, human justice is ultimately ungrounded because men are not gods or supermen: they cannot base their thinking and living on certain knowledge of ethical standards, and hence cannot know where his justice is grounded. Nietzsche, of course, speaks of the ultimate ground of judgment, that is, will to power as the essence of life and nature. This kind of Nietzsche's project for a naturalist justice, however, has been criticized either for his hierarchical ordering of things, or for his abstraction of concrete environmentalism from his estimations (Andrew, 1995, p.150). This kind of problematic or limitations of naturalist ethics is inherent throughout Nietzsche's work. He wants to escape from this contradiction, but he appears not to do so much. We can explain such limitations of Nietzschean

naturalist conception of (environmental) justice, by tracing back the process of his conception.

From his early work, as we have seen before, Nietzsche struggles against the super-natural principles of knowledge and morality (or justice). In doing so, he transfers justice from the sphere of morality to 'aesthetic' nature of the world: justice belongs no longer morality, but it is worked by artists and philosophers. It is "art and *not* morality" which "is presented as the truly *metaphysical* activity of man", as the standards of judgment (or of justice) (BT AS 5). Yet, in order to justify this transfer, Nietzsche sustains inevitably a hierarchy of values, because artists and philosophers must proceed solely on their own authority. But this authority has no ground. Nietzsche, of cause, attempts to ground their activity on nature, But he faces with a contradiction between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, or between life and nature: "Contradiction, ... spoke out from the very heart of nature" (BT 4). In other words, artists and philosophers cannot appeal to nature for help, for "nature is a bad economist" (SE 7).

In his later work, Nietzsche continues to seek a proper, that is, 'this-worldly', ground of just life. To do so, he turns from aesthetic justice which as Nietzsche himself admits contributes metaphysical comfort as romantics or as Christians, to more naturalist justice (and ethics). In doing so, he wants to translate man back into nature more explicitly, that is, Nietzsche himself wants to return back to nature more seriously. But his naturalist ethics becomes not only more abstract, but also more confusing his reader. For instance, when he cautions to the Stoics who proposes to live 'according to nature', Nietzsche seems to understand critically nature as boundless, indifferent and amoral, and hence argues that the Stoics' proposal of living according to nature is only "to impose [their] morality, [their] ideal, on nature" (BGE 9). But on the other hand, life remains bounded by a horizon of anthropocentric

preference and values. Life itself requires us to legislate, to design, to register preferences - in short, to 'deviate' from Nature, to be other than this nature.

We can see here a tension between nature and life, which still remains and even becomes more serious in Nietzsche's later thinking. We can see this tension, especially in terms of a contradiction between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, which are in relation to nature and justice respectively. That is, the morality that Nietzsche originally associated with the Dionysian impulse attaches to Nature: living 'according to Nature' would entail a degree of boundlessness, of indifference (Conway, 1995, 38). But in the Greek world justice (*dike*) was understood in terms of limits or boundaries. Life and the established order of things were justified and maintained if the measures or limits fixed by Apollo, 'the god of individuation and of just boundaries' (BT 9) could be observed (Keenan, 1995, p.252). This kind of tension between nature and life in Nietzsche's work entails the limits to naturalist conception of environmental justice at several points.

(1) Nietzsche attempts to overcome nihilism, by removing the metaphysical or super-natural principles which has been imposed upon both nature and human nature. But he does not impose a meaning or value on nature: nature is amoral and indifferent. Thus, even though nature functions as a standard for the artist's or philosopher's judgment, this function operates only negatively, as the lack of all supernatural constraints. Nietzsche's 'translation of man back into nature' thus has a significance only in the form of a resistance to all metaphysical or super-natural interpretations of life. This resistance frees nature from the constraints imposed on it by pre-determined convictions and accounts of its powers and possibilities. But nature which has been freed from the constraints does not function without abstraction, without will to power, which allows it to define itself in its own

spontaneous expression and unfolding. In this sense, Conway (1995, p.42) argues that "Indeed the further we pursue his naturalism, the more apparent his dilemma becomes: Nature may serve either as a standard for nomothetic legislations or as an indifferent amoral agency, but it cannot serve in both capacities simultaneously".

(2) While Nietzsche does not give a positive characterization of nature to which he wants to return, he tends to regard implicitly human nature as expressing itself in its essence, in will to power. In his early work, the return to nature is implied in his treatment of artist and philosopher as sole authority or justification for aesthetic preferences. In his later writings, Nietzsche figures life as *will to power* as an agency for life of all individual human agents. What is more, life is equated with nature in mediation of the will to power. It is at this point that the traditional separation between nature and humans disappears in Nietzsche's work. But, at the same time, his appeal to will to power comes to constitute a logical consequence of self-reference, self-overcoming, or 'self-realization of life itself', as Nietzsche himself calls it. In this context, he would not avoid a critique that "Nietzsche enthrones taste ... as the organ of a knowledge beyond true and false, beyond good and evil. But he cannot legitimate the criteria of aesthetic judgement that he holds on to because he transposes aesthetic experience into the archaic" (Habermas, 1987, p.96). Although he has contributed greatly to our growing appreciation of the crisis of subject-centered reason, Nietzsche himself concludes his critique of rationality by enshrining 'other' of reason, the will to power, rather than abandon such a reason.

(3) Even though Nietzsche does not endow nature to which he wants to return with no positive content or universal character, he offers instead a distinctively personal account of it. That is, "I too speak of a 'return to Nature', although it is really not a going back but an ascent - up into the high,

free, even terrible Nature and naturalness where great tasks are something one plays with, one may play with. To put it metaphorically: Napoleon was a piece of 'return to Nature, as I understand the phrase' (TI, Skirmishes of an untimely man, 48). Nietzsche's idea of the ascent is in fact conceived in opposition to the 'tyranny of the majority', which marks both the Rousseau's and Darwin's figuration of the natural. What is more, Nietzsche instead proposes an aristocratic society supported by what he calls 'master morality', while he seeks to discredit 'slave morality, the morality demanding that the weak be protected from the strong. One may accept Nietzsche's criticism of the tyranny of the majority'. It does not follow, however, that an ascent of nature does not warrant a natural aristocracy that Nietzsche applauds¹⁰. If, as Nietzsche himself writes, "Life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation" (BGE 259), the victory of slave morality is more natural than that of master morality.

In sum, Nietzsche's attempt to formulate naturalistic ethics as a dehumanization of morality in terms of will to power and other seemingly novel ideas appears in the end to proceed in a way which can be compared with that in which Christianity has denaturalized morality, the way which Nietzsche criticizes as "absolute misunderstanding and self-deception" (WP 215) (see table 1). Nietzsche's datum is, the strong of masters *desire power*. At the first step, Nietzsche attempts to remove the metaphysical or super-natural principles from nature, but he does not impose a meaning or moral value on nature: nature comes to be seen as amoral and indifferent. At the second step, while Nietzsche does not give a positive characterization of nature to which he wants to return, he tends to regard human nature as expressing itself in its essence, in will to power. At

Table 1. Nietzsche against Christianity for naturalization of morality

	Christianity as a denaturalization (humanization) of morality	Nietzsche for dehumanization (naturalization) of morality
Datum	the oppressed, the lowly, the great masses of slaves <i>desire power</i>	the strong, the high, the few number of masters <i>desire power</i>
First step	they make themselves free	they make nature amoral
Second step	they demand recognition, equal rights, 'justice'	they demand will to power, to justice, as human essence
Third step	they demand privileges	they demand self-overcoming
Fourth step	they demand 'exclusive' power	they demand a 'naturalist' aristocracy

the third step, Nietzsche's appeal to will to power come to constitute a logical consequence of self-reference, or 'self-realization of life itself'. At the final step, even though Nietzsche does not endow nature with no positive content or universal character, he offers instead a distinctively personal account of it, that is, 'naturalist aristocracy' supported by 'master morality', while debasing 'slave morality'. In the end, Nietzschean naturalist justice turns out to be justice for the strong(est), not for the weak.

6. Conclusion

"Morality in Europe", Nietzsche says, "is herd animal morality" (BGE 202). This specific form of herd morality which has supported Western modernity, or What Nietzsche calls nihilism, involves the humanization of nature and denaturalization of humans. Nietzsche's comprehension of modernity includes not only a diagnosis of nihilism to describe the sickness of human beings and nature both of which were devalued by modern consciousness, but also a projected overcoming of nihilism which consists in preparing the ground for a new philosophy and ethics.

The very possibility of 'returning to nature' or of naturalist justice is more or less defined by its opposition to this form of morality, and of

modernity, that is, the dehumanization of nature and renaturalization of humans. Nietzsche's naturalist philosophy and, in particular, his argument for naturalist justice provides very significant implications for ecology in general and for conception of environmental justice in particular. But his naturalist ethics also includes a highly controversial problematic, which can be seen as an unavoidable limit to Nietzschean naturalist ethics.

If justice is conceptualized for the strong, what should the weak do? Nietzsche conceives the simplification of humans at his time as "Not 'return to nature': for no natural humanity has ever existed yet. ... man only reaches Nature after a long struggle" (WP 120). This consideration would be still or more seriously true in the contemporary world, in spite of Nietzsche's own struggle. Thus it can be said that "In order for Life to flourish, philosophers [including Nietzsche] must inherit the sins of Oedipus" (Conway, 1995, p.48). We do not know how many Nietzschean higher men would have been born and died on this earth, in order for our attitude to nature, and to morality (and justice) to be more natural.

Notes

- 1) Numbers refer to sections rather than to pages, and reference to Nietzsche's works are as follows: AC = *The*

- Antichrist*; BGE = *Beyond Good and Evil*; BT = *The Birth of Tragedy* (AS: "Attempt at a Self-Criticism"); EH = *Ecole Homo*; GM = *On the Genealogy of Morals*; GS = *The Gay Science*; HAH = *Human All Too Human*; ST = *Schopenhauer as Educator*; TI = *Twilight of the Idols*; WP = *The Will to Power*; Za = *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (P: 'Prologue). I use *The Portable Nietzsche* for edition and translation of AC, TI, and Za; and *Basic Writings of Nietzsche* for edition and translation of BGE, BT, EH, and GM.
- 2) But deep ecologists deny an affinity of their ecophilosophy with Nietzsche's thought, as they want to compare themselves "with the mountain - this is not meant to be a grand metaphor for a possible humanity, like Nietzsche's *Übermensch* ..., but an actual, living mountain" (Naess, 1989, p.3). Yet they admire Spinoza's naturalistic ethics (Naess, 1977), which has an affinity with that of Nietzsche. See, for a discussion of the close relation between Spinoza and Nietzsche, Spencer (1931), Yovel (1986); Schacht (1995, pp.167-186).
 - 3) According to Kennington (1978, p.201), however, "the common judgment is that Francis Bacon is the originator of the concept of 'mastery of nature' which is so indispensable in the technological [and environmental] crisis of this century", as Dewey traces this thesis to Bacon and passes over Descartes. Leiss (1994, ch.3) also relates primarily the domination of nature thesis to Bacon rather than Descartes.
 - 4) But Luke's (1984) interpretation, "Unlike all of his contemporaries, Rousseau denies that nature is nothing but a dead object, a complex aggregate of rational principles, a passive reserve of raw material for human production. Nature, for Rousseau, is itself an active subject - it is both freedom and necessity, producer and product, subject and object" (p.224). In Luke's view, this concept of nature is matched with Rousseau in his political philosophy, "an enemy of positive science, economic utility, commodity-fetishism, and the individual alienation engendered by the bourgeois lifeworld" (p.239).
 - 5) This concept of nature, represented in terms of 'the earth', embeds the first concept of nature, and whether a given use of the expression 'nature' refers to both or exclusively one or the other of these natures depends on the particular context (Schatzki, 1994, p.154).
 - 5) In this sense, Nietzsche's naturalism was not merely comprised with, but also critical to, Darwinian evolutionary biology and physiology, even though "Nietzsche's distinction between slave and noble morality was based on physiological considerations, as were his correlative divisions between strong and weak, ascending and descending, and healthy and unhealthy forms of life" (Schatzki, 1994, p.148).
 - 7) In this sense, Conway (1995, 34) understands that "Indeed, we might characterize the interpretative project of the 1886

Preface as the recovery of *The Birth of Tragedy* as a naturalist manifest".

- 8) Yet Deleuze continues that "to confuse force and will is even more risky. ... Force is what can, will to power is what wills". Seen from this argument, the will to power seems to be a version of metaphysical being, while it is affirmed only in becoming (or 'eternal return').
- 9) Arguing that "Nietzsche's perspectival justice differs from impersonal Platonic justice in that it calls for a plurality of perspectives, a multiplicity of 'loud personal eyes'", Andrew (1995, pp.164-167) compares Nietzsche's (and Proust's) perspectival justice with contemporary pluralist theory of justice developed by M. Walzer (1983), I. M. Young (1990), and others. But, according to other interpreters such as Yovel (1986), Nietzsche shares with Spinoza their adherence, in their theory of man, to a strict naturalistic monism. For both philosophers there is a single natural principle active in man that constitutes his individual existence: Spinoza calls it <conatus>, Nietzsche, 'will to power'. Some others such as Deleuze understands that Nietzsche's notion of will to power entails both monism and pluralism, as Schrift (1995, p.257) points out that "Nietzsche's semiotically condensed formula has its analog in what Deleuze and Guattari call their 'magic formula ... PLURALISM = MONISM'".
- 10) In this sense, Zeitlin (1994, p.171) argues that "He merely prefers and endorses the 'master morality' as a matter of taste. We know what Nietzsche was against; but what did he affirm ? ... Nietzsche leaves us with his own peculiar, beyond-good-and-evil aestheticism".

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