

Adjunct Roles and External Predication

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Kim, Yong-Beom. 1998. **Adjunct Roles and External Predication.** *Language and Information* 2.1, 157-176. This paper claims that beneficiary adjuncts are best analyzed as involving external predication in a version of grammatical framework called Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar. This paper also claims that verbal categories need to include the attribute INDEX among their semantic components in order to account for the external predication proposed in this paper. This paper distinguishes between recipient and beneficiary roles and assumes that the former is a semantic argument of a verb-type relation and that the latter is an adjunct which makes a semantic contribution as a modifier. This approach achieves a unified analysis of modification phenomena of nominal and verbal categories and it can also accommodate Parson's (1990) idea that a verbal category denotes a set of events, not just an event. (Kwangwoon University)

1. Introduction

This paper addresses one of the linking problems¹ involving

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¹See Bresnan and Moshi (1990) and Wechsler (1995) for the details of linking

prepositional phrases (PPs), focusing particularly on the beneficiary use of *for*, and argues that such PPs are best analyzed as adjunct PPs. In this paper I propose that external predication is more appropriate for these PPs than Wechsler's (1995) argument-annexing analysis. The argument and analysis put forth in this paper assume a constraint-based grammatical framework called Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar and related semantic theories. The argument of this paper crucially hinges on a semantic analysis of PPs as proposed by Gawron (1986a) who provides a three-way distinction among PPs: argument PPs, co-predicators and adjuncts.

On the basis of Gawron's analysis of PPs and other basic principles of semantics, I will propose that verbal categories should be assigned the attribute INDEX and that (some subdomain of) the CTT (content) value of the verbal signs should be list-valued instead of matrix-valued. Section 2 introduces the main points of Gawron's analysis and identifies adverbial PPs as distinct from either co-predicational PPs or argument PPs. Section 3 reviews an HPSG analysis of linking problems as suggested in Wechsler's treatment of PPs. Section 4 examines problems related to modification structures and puts forth a unified analysis of adverbial and adjectival modification, adopting Parsons' (1990) idea. Section 5 provides an HPSG treatment for the unified approach which exploits external arguments of events.

2. Three Semantic Types of PPs

This section is virtually a review of Gawron's (1986a) paper.

problems.

In his 1986a paper Gawron identifies three different semantic types of PPs. Let us consider the examples in (1) and (2).

- (1) a. John hit the stick against the fence.
b. *John hit the stick.
- (2) a. John broke the vase against the hammer.
b. John broke the vase.

What could explain the acceptability difference between (1b) and (2b)? If the verb *hit* can be classified semantically as *impingement* verb, as argued in Gawron, we can make the following observations. First, we may need an agent initiating the hitting event. In addition, an impingement situation needs two more objects. One such object may be an entity participating in a forceful movement; the other may be an entity which gets involved in a violent contact with the moving object. (1b) is unacceptable if the entity denoted by *the stick* takes on an *instrumental* role. In this case the moving object denoted by [the stick] lacks the counterpart to move against. This may explain why (1b) is unacceptable. So we can say that the entity denoted by the object NP of *against* in (1a) fills one of the roles needed for the arguments of the verb *hit*. So the PP in this case is called an argument PP.

We can also accept that the preposition *against* is a two-place predicate denoting forceful contact or impingement between two entities. So (1a) is the typical example where the verb and the preposition denote almost the same range of meaning, the denotation of the former being subsumed by that of the latter.

However, the verb *break* has different properties. If *break* were of the same semantic type as *hit*, there should be no

grammaticality difference between (1b) and (2b). However, there are a few significant differences in terms of thematic roles. In (2) the entity denoted by the object NP (*the vase*) is 'affected' and this makes *break* different from *hit* whose object does not have the property of being 'affected'. Furthermore, [the stick] necessarily gets involved in movement as an argument of *hit* but [the vase], when combined with *break* does not implicate location change in any inherent sense of the phrase.² So the semantics of *break* does not involve *impingement*.

The verb *break* can also be parsimonious in taking syntactic arguments as in (3):

- (3) The vase broke.

So the verb *break* does not need multiple objects for it to be syntactically or semantically well-formed. Incidentally, it is also true that (2a) depicts a situation where two objects are in a forceful clash against each other. However, the sense of *impingement* is attributable, in fact, to the preposition *against*, as mentioned in footnote 2.

If we compare the translations of (1a) and (2a) as shown in (4a) and (4b), respectively, we can notice some crucial

²There is a noticeable sense of movement involved in (2a) and also in (ia) below.

- (i) a. He cut his foot against the rock.
 b. He cut his foot.
 c. The vase broke (against the wall).

As we can see in (b), the sense of movement is not inherent to the meaning of *cut* (or *break*). Rather it is a contribution of the meaning of *against* as a *impingement* predicate. So we can say that *break* and *cut* does not contain movement in their meaning components.

differences in the semantics of the two verbs. I followed Gawron's convention since it can show the semantic differences of the two verbs. It should be noted that *hit* is a three-place relation as argued before and *against* a two-place predicate; *break* is analyzed as a two-place predicate:³

- (4) a. Jack hit the stick against the fence.
 {<\$LOC0, hit, \$A, \$B, \$C> <Jack, \$A>
 <the-stick, \$C> <the-fence, \$B>
 <\$LOC1, IMPINGEMENT \$C, \$B>}
 b. Jack broke the vase against the hammer.
 {<\$LOC2, break, \$A, \$B> <Jack, \$A>
 <the-vase, \$B> <the-hammer, \$C>
 <\$LOC3, IMPINGEMENT \$B, \$C>}

As we can see in (4a), the PP object (*the fence*) in (4a) is interpreted as the argument of the predicate *hit* while its counterpart (*the-hammer*) in (4b) is not translated. Instead the predicates *break* share the argument [the-vase] with *against* (translated as IMPINGEMENT) which in turn takes an additional argument [the hammer]. So the preposition in (4b) has an argument which is connected to another predicate by argument-coindexing and so this type of preposition can be called a co-predicator in a sense.

We can identify another type of PP: adjunct PP. Consider (5):

- (5) John walked under the bridge.

³\$X is a symbol which Gawron uses in his 1986b paper and it is termed as indeterminates—dummies standing in place of ordinary objects and its function is to provide type information of his theoretical objects. I employed his notation since it can efficiently represent the roles shared by two predicates.

According to Gawron, the PP in (5) has two readings. One is a goal reading; the other is a location reading. On the former, the preposition describes a relation between [John] and [the bridge] and the meaning of the verb limits the mode of movement. *Under* on this reading relates two individual objects and one of its arguments is co-indexed with that of *walk*. So the PP in this sense is viewed a co-predicating PP. On the other hand, the same preposition can be seen as a relation between [John's walking] and [the bridge]. So no *event-internal* argument of *walk* is coindexed with any argument of *under*. Therefore, the PP on this reading can be seen as an adjunct.

There are cases, however, where the distinction between argument PPs and adjunct PPs is not clear. One such case is the one involving a beneficiary use of *for*. Consider (6):

- (6) a. John made a sweater for Mary.
 b. John made Mary a sweater.

(6a) seems to be ambiguous between an 'intended recipient' reading and a 'beneficiary' reading whereas (6b) appears to have only an 'intended recipient' reading. So *for Mary* interpreted as an intended recipient in (6a) can be thought of as an argument PP.

On the other hand, the examples in (7) shows that *for-NP* is not always an argument.

- (7) a. John made a sweater for Miles for Mary.
 b. John made a sweater for Mary for Miles.

If *for Mary* were an semantic argument, the repeated appearance

would violate the basic principle of compositionality, because the PP of this type can be repeated arbitrarily many times in examples like (7). Furthermore (7a) and (7b) do not have the same meaning. In (7a) John's making a sweater for Miles was to the interest of Mary while in (7b) John's behavior for Mary was to the advantage of Miles.

If these PPs in (7) cannot be analyzed as arguments, one viable option is to treat them as adjuncts. An example like (8) provide another piece of evidence that *for-NP* is sometimes an adjunct.

(8) Could you buy this for me?

If a street vendor utters (8), the intended recipient cannot be the seller himself.

I propose in this paper that there should be a distinction made between two related thematic roles: (intended) recipient and beneficiary. Recipients usually fills argument roles while beneficiaries can fill either argument roles' or adjunct roles. Recipients are usually the end point of transfer of objects moving between two individuals. So this notion involves an individual participating in an action or event along with other individuals. In other words, the notion depicts an object in a relation holding among event-internal objects. So a recipient can be seen as a constituent or a formative of an event. This explains why phrases denoting recipients cannot reiterate but appear only once in a sentence.

¹I believe beneficiaries usually fill adjunct roles, but I cannot exclude the possibility of their assuming argument roles. If a verb meaning [behave on behalf of _] (e.g., . *patronize*) has a NP object, it may arguably be considered a beneficiary argument.

In the case of beneficiaries, on the other hand, the notion depicts a relation between an event and an individual external to that event, as illustrated in (9).

- (9) a. We fought for our country.
b. I cooked for Mary.
c. I cooked for Mary for her mother.
d. They worked for peace.
e. They worked for peace for the whole world.

In (9b) [my cooking] is to the interest of [Mary], and in (9c) [my cooking for Mary] is to the interest of [her mother]. Therefore, the relation *for* in (9) holds between events and event-external individuals. This much difference seems to justify positing different analyses for recipient and beneficiary readings.

3. Linking Problems

Any linguistic theory which deals with thematic roles should capture in a general way certain relations holding between argument positions of a predicate and the roles that the argument positions bear. Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG) crucially employs the notion of linking, and linking these two domains has been an area of much debate among the HPSG practitioners. In this section, I will review some of the main points proposed in Wechsler (1995), focusing particularly on PPs.

Wechsler (1995) attempts to capture the generalization that some prepositions are semantically selected by the meanings of verbs as in *yearn for*, *long for*, *wish for*, etc. This can be done by placing restrictions on linking rules so that some roles can

be shared by two NP positions. For instance, *seek*, when used as an intransitive verb, would have a kind of argument structure as shown in (10):⁶

(10) *seek*

$$\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{SUBCAT} \langle \text{NP}:[1], \quad \text{PP}[\text{for}]:[2] \rangle \\ \text{ROLES} \langle [\text{SEEKER} [1]], \quad [\text{SOUGHT} [2][+r]] \rangle \end{array} \right]$$

So the verb *seek* itself is a two-place relation which needs SEEKER and SOUGHT roles. On the other hand, the desiderative preposition *for* is assumed to have a lexical entry as shown in (11):

(11) *for*

$$\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{CAT} \quad \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{HEAD} \\ \text{SUBCAT} \quad \langle \text{NP}[i] \rangle \end{array} \right] \\ \text{CTT} \quad \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{REL} \\ \text{ROLE} \quad \langle [\text{DESIRER}:[i]], [\text{DESIRED}:[j]] \rangle \end{array} \right] \end{array} \right]$$

desire

In (10) and (11), $[j]$ and $[k]$ should be token-identical when the above structures are combined in the same configuration. This is done by a special linking principle in Wechsler⁷ which says that if a restricted thematic role filling a verbal argument subsumes its counterpart of a prepositional argument, the two roles must be linked. This seems to be the correct way to deal with these

⁶The [+r] in (10) indicates that the role with this specification has a *restricted* thematic role in the sense that its role is marked by a preposition with a specific meaning rather than by a grammatical case. See Bresnan and Moshi (1990) for details.

⁷See Wechsler 1995:70-72.

lexical dependencies.

However, in his analysis of other PPs, Wechsler propose that the recipient PP[for] should be seen semantically as an adjunct but syntactically as an complement. For instance, the main verb of (12a) should have a lexical specification shown in (12b):

- (12) a. John carved a statue for Mary.
 b. *carve*

$$\left[\begin{array}{l} CAT \left[\begin{array}{l} HEAD \qquad \qquad \qquad V \\ SUBCAT \langle \dots NP:[int. \textit{rec.}][2] \dots \rangle \end{array} \right] \\ CTT \left[\begin{array}{l} REL \qquad \qquad \qquad \textit{carve} \\ ROLE \qquad \langle [AGT], [THM] \rangle \\ ADJ-ROLE \quad INT. REC.[2][+r] \end{array} \right] \end{array} \right]$$

This analysis implicates that the object position of the PP is interpreted not as a first-class argument of the main verb but as a second-class member. This move may be inevitable given the current HPSG framework, but the representation in question is nonetheless misleading. It gives us an impression that the added argument is an adjunct or adverbial phrase. Furthermore, in his analysis Wechsler ignores one important fact about (12a). That is, he does not provide an analysis for beneficiary reading of the PP in question.

As we argued above, PPs can be classified into three different categories and beneficiary PPs[for] in (6) are seen as adverbials. In this paper, using a version of HPSG framework, I will attempt to incorporate into my analysis the basic idea that adverbial PPs are adjunctive PPs in Gawron's (1986a) term and

⁷'NP:[int. rec]' in (12) is intended to represent an NP with an 'intended recipient role'.

that they are functors for the ‘event-external’ argument which VPs provide. Consider (13).

- (13) a. John ran quickly.
 b. John ran for the orphans

In the realm of HPSG, there has not been a satisfactory treatment of these constructions, as far as my knowledge goes. In the next section I will look into some of the important characteristics of adverbial modifiers and propose an external predication approach.

4. Modification vs Predication

In this section, I will examine what type of semantic relation adverbial PPs should have relative to their semantic heads, considering that it determines the AVM of modification structures in general. Before doing this, I will attempt to repair some asymmetries found between two types of modified structures as shown in the traditional translations of the phrases. Consider (14). (I ignore quantifiers here since they are not relevant to my discussion.)

- (14) a. a quick walk → quick'(x) & walk'(x)
 b. walks quickly → quickly'(walk')
 c. runs for John → for-John'(run')

Is there any a priori reason that the adjective-noun sequence should differ from the verb- adverbial string in translation? In this paper, I will propose that the modification phrases in (14a),

(14b) and (14c) can receive a unified treatment if we posit different translations for (14b) and (14c) as suggested by Parsons (1990). In this vein, I will suggest that (14b) and (14c) should be translated as in (15a) and (15b) respectively.

- (15) a. walks quickly \rightarrow quick'(e) & walk'(e)
 b. runs for John \rightarrow for-John'(e) & run'(e)

The above translation resembles Parsons' analysis,⁶ but my motivation for (15) is different from Parsons'. My main argument for this comes from the consideration of some conceptual differences between head-complement structures and head-modifier structures. Modification is different from predication and this distinction should be maintained cross-categorically. Basically in a model-theoretic semantics, predication is captured by functional application in a predicate logic as shown in (16)

- (16) a. John walks \rightarrow walk'(j)
 b. John loves Mary \rightarrow love'(j, m)

On the other hand, modification is usually captured by set intersection, as shown in (17).⁷ The translation in (17a) is equivalent to the set expression in (17b).

⁶As Parsons (1990:7) argues, the symmetrical approach proposed here allows for a nice account of various phenomena including the inference relations of propositions, semantics of causatives, semantics of perception statements, semantics of events, etc.

⁷I am aware of some difficulties employing this simplistic set-intersection approach. For instance, many adjectives like *former*, *alleged*, *small*, etc. pose the well-known problems, which are beyond the scope of this paper.

- (17) a. tall boy \rightarrow tall'(x) & boy'(x)
 b. {x|tall'(x)} \cap {x|boy'(x)}

Our reasoning can be graphically illustrated in an intuitive way as shown in (18):



The intuition I am trying to convey here is that functional application is a semantic operation involved in building a saturated expressions crucially using at least one unsaturated building block. This captures a common belief that a functor is a semantic category that needs another expression as its argument.

On the other hand, modification can be seen as an operation between sets of objects, saturated or not, through which a narrower reference is made by the equal contribution from each part of the meaning components. This process does not involve saturation, but a kind of delimitation over semantic objects.

From what has been discussed above, we can claim that the phrases involving adverbial modification should be translated as in (15) not as in (14b) or (14c). This implies that verbs cannot be seen as denoting an event, but a set of events, as Parsons (1990) proposed. This means that verbs denotes *kinds* of eventualities and that the related semantics should introduce variables in order to translate them into logical expressions. This is equivalent to introducing an *event-external* argument (or INDEX in HPSG terms) for the semantics of the verbal signs as

b. modified:

$$\left[\begin{array}{ll} \text{INDEX} & [i] \\ \text{RSTR} & \langle [k] \rangle \end{array} \right]$$

As we have suggested before, the structure should contain an *event-external* argument for an event depicted by a verb. So verbal categories will have as its CTT value not only REL (relation) and AGR (arguments) but INDEX just as nominal signs do."

Furthermore, we should take into account the fact that (7a) and (7b) have different interpretations as repeated in (20):

- (20) a. John made a sweater for Miles for Mary. (=7a)
 b. John made a sweater for Mary for Miles. (=7b)

Simply allowing set values in the semantic content of verbal categories will not serve our purpose, since a set-valued approach cannot distinguish between the two different readings. This is because ordinary sets cannot capture ordering relations. Sentences in (21) also indicates that the distinction we are trying to make is not a case of an isolated incidence.

- (21) a. John did it clumsily for Mary
 b. John did it for Mary clumsily.

In (21a) the preferred reading is John's clumsy behavior was to Mary's interest; in (21b), on the other hand, John's clumsy

¹¹One reviewer pointed out that the idea of assigning indexical values to the semantic content of verbal categories has already been proposed by Copestake, Flickinger, and Sag (1997), which readers are advised to refer to for details. Their motivation for such a move is to provide a more succinct account of scope ambiguities. Here I am concerned with adverbial modification.

behavior was probably due to lack of tactics. These examples motivate us to put an additional constraint on the semantic content of the modification structure. That is, the order of adverbials is significant in semantics and this calls for a change in the structure of RSTR (restriction). One way of capturing the ordering relation is to employ as the value of RSTR an ordered set (*list*) rather than an ordinary set. Also note that (20a) and (20b) can sometimes be used interchangeably. This possibility does not undermine my proposal for an ordered set since we can work out a translation that can ignore ordering relations.

Given all these revisions, *for* as a beneficiary adjunct preposition will have the structure shown in (22).¹²

(22) AVM for *for* as an beneficiary adjunct preposition

$$\left[\begin{array}{l} CAT \left[\begin{array}{l} HEAD \left[\begin{array}{l} MOD \ V: \left[\begin{array}{l} CTT \left[\begin{array}{l} INDEX \ [5] \\ RSTC \ [6] \end{array} \right] \\ - \end{array} \right] \\ PRD \end{array} \right] \end{array} \right] \\ \\ CTT \left[\begin{array}{l} INDEX \ [5] \\ RSTR \ < \left[\begin{array}{l} REL \ \text{for} \\ BNFCTR \ [5] \\ BNFCRY \ [4] \end{array} \right] > \cup \langle [6] \rangle \end{array} \right] \end{array} \right] \end{array} \right]$$

Having the identical values shared by INDEX and BNFCTR (benefactor) is a result of lexical specifications of *for*. The AVM in (22) says that this structure is a modifier and will modify a

¹²In addition, as Pollard and Sag (1994) put forth, we need a kind of ID schema and semantics principle as defined in Pollard and Sag (1994: 56) in order to make up for the Head Feature Principle.

verbal category (which denotes an event and which can be referred to as [5] with a semantic restriction of [6] on it). It also says that the event will be to the benefit of an individual indexed as [4]. The result of the modification will yield the structure having the restrictions contributed from both the modifier and the modified, although this is achieved by a separate stipulation in HPSG.

Finally, the relevant part of the AVM for *run for Mary* would have the structure as shown in (23).¹³ In this case, as we suggested before, we need to introduce an event-type object as contrasted with an individual-type object.

(23) AVM for *run for Mary*

$$\left[\begin{array}{l} CAT \\ CTT \end{array} \left[\begin{array}{l} INDEX \\ RSTR \end{array} \left\langle \left[\begin{array}{l} REL \\ ARG \\ E-INS \end{array} \right] \begin{array}{l} run \\ [1] \\ [5] \end{array} \right\rangle, \left[\begin{array}{l} REL \\ BNFCTR \\ BNFCRY \end{array} \right] \begin{array}{l} for \\ [5] \\ Mary \end{array} \right\rangle \right] \right]$$

I will employ the attribute name E-INS to cover event-type objects and this attribute will be a component of a verb-type relation which itself becomes a component of a restriction on semantic contents of events.¹⁴

¹³SUBCAT is ignored. E-INS is an abbreviation used to stand for an event-type entities. BNFCTR stands for 'benefactor' and BNFCRY is for 'beneficiary'.

¹⁴An anonymous referee raised a question regarding embedding the same indexical values within their own domain. However, there may not arise serious problems of recursion since the same indexical values are shared by different attributes such as INDEX, E-INS and BNFCTR. So there is no pernicious recursion of value assignment. Furthermore the 'append' operation does

As in many other categories, we can also designate an *external* argument of a preposition in Williams'(1980) sense and then it will usually be the one that corresponds to the non-subcategorized-for position. This *external* position plays a role as a kind of connecting joint when prepositional phrases participate in modification. This can be made into a separate convention to the effect that an *external* argument is the one that shares its value with its relevant counterpart in a modification structure. As a result, we may infer, just as with verbal categories, we can designate the same type of external argument within the argument structure of prepositions.

6. Conclusions

In this paper, using a version of HPSG framework, I have attempted to provide a unified analysis of modification structures, i.e., adjectival and adverbial modifications and, I argue, this is motivated by the theoretical need of external predication on events, especially in connection with adverbial PPs. However my proposal is of a provisional nature and need further investigation in that a complete account of event indexing would probably need to take more factors in account, i.e., identity of events, the similarities and dissimilarities of nominal and verbal INSTANCE. However, many authors, like Peterson (1979, 1982), Parsons (1990), Lasershon (1995) and others have felt a need for a kind of event indexing, or assumed its existence especially in connection with event reference.

My original plan of this paper was to extend my argument to

not create an embedded structure but a flat structure, so there is no possibility of harmful embedding.

many other modification structures, such as post-nominal modification structures involving participles, present or past, relative clauses, prepositional phrases, etc. The discussion in this paper, however, is limited to beneficiary adjuncts. Although I believe the same reasoning can be applicable to manner adverbials as well, separate papers may be needed to tackle other modification structures.

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