KDI Journal of Economic Policy
- 제14권1호
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- Pages.191-212
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- 1992
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- 2586-2995(pISSN)
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- 2586-4130(eISSN)
불완전(不完全)한 정보하(情報下)의 통화(通貨)의 투자증대효과분석(投資增大效果分析): 중복세대모형(重複世代模型)을 이용한 일반균형적(一般均衡的) 접근(接近)
Money and Capital Accumulation under Imperfect Information: A General Equilibrium Approach Using Overlapping Generations Model
초록
본고(本稿)에서는 채권자(債權者)와 채무자간(債務者間)에 계약불이행문제(契約不履行問題)(contract enforcement problem)가 존재함에 따라 금융시장이 자금중개기능(資金仲介機能)을 원활하게 수행하지 못하는 경제하에서, 자본축적과정(資本蓄積科程)에 있어서 화폐(貨幣)의 역할을 이론적으로 고찰하였다. 분석을 위해서, 생산을 위해 차입(借入)하는 기업(企業)과 생산자금을 공급하는 채권자(債權者)가 공존하는 중복세대모형(重複世代模型)(overlapping generation model)을 구성하여 양자간에 정보(情報)의 불완전성(不完全性)으로 인해 계약불이행문제(契約不履行問題)가 초래되는 상황을 내생적(內生的)으로 도출하고, 중앙은행(中央銀行)의 대출정책(貸出政策)을 통한 통화공급(通貨供給)이 기업의 투자(投資), GNP, 인플레, 시장금리(市場金利) 등에 미치는 동태적(動態的) 효과(效果)를 살펴보고자 하였다. 본고(本稿)의 "시뮬레이션"분석에 의하면 중앙은행의 대출정책은 민간금융시장에서 충분한 투자재원(投資財源)을 조달하지 못하는 기업(企業)에게 새로이 발행되는 화폐(newly printed money)로 대출금을 공급함으로써 불완전한 민간금융시장을 보완(補完)하여 실물투자(實物投資)와 생산(生産)의 증대효과(增大效果)를 가져올 수 있다. 이와 아울러 중앙은행의 대출정책(貸出政策)과 재정당국(財政當局)의 총액(總額) 조세(租稅)-이전정책(移轉政策)(lump sum tax-cum-transfer policy)을 적절히 조합(組合)하면 각 경제주체의 후생(厚生)이 자유방임경제하(自由放任經濟下)에서의 후생에 비하여 중대되는 "파레토"우월배분(優越配分)(Pareto superior allocation)이 가능하다는 결과가 도출되었다.
This paper discusses the role of money in the process of capital accumulation where financial markets are impeded by contract enforcement problems in the context of overlapping generations framework. In particular, in less developed countries (LDCs) creditors may know little about the repayment capability of potential debtors due to incomplete information so that financial instruments other than money may not acceptable to them. In this paper the impediments to the operation of the private finanical markets are explicitly modelled. We argue that creditors cannot observe actual investment decisions made by the potential borrowers, and as a result, loan contracts may not be fully enforceable. Therefore, a laissez-faire regime may fail to provide the economy with the appropriate financial instruments. Under these circumstances, we introduce a government operated discount window (DW) that acts as an open market buyer of private debt. This theoretical structure represents the practice of governments of many LDCs to provide loans (typically at subsidized interest rates) to preferred borrowers either directly or indirectly through the commercial banking system. It is shown that the DW can substantially overcome impediments to trade which are caused by the credit market failure. An appropriate supply of the DW loan enables producers to purchase the resources they cannot obtain through direct transactions in the credit market. This result obtains even if the DW is subject to the same enforcement constraint that is responsible for the market failure. Thus, the DW intervention implies higher investment and output. However, the operation of the DW may cause inflation. Furthermore, the provision of cheap loans through the DW results in a worse income distribution. Therefore, there is room for welfare enhancing schemes that utilize the higher output to develop. We demonstrate that adequate lump sum taxes-cum-transfers along with the operation of the DW can support an allocation that is Pareto superior to the laissez-faire equilibrium allocation.
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