

## Transition to the Small Family: A Comparison of 1964–1973 Time Trends in Korea and Taiwan

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Few countries can be shown to be passing through the transition to small family size that had not already done so some decades ago. Korea and Taiwan are virtually the only societies in which this transition is occurring and which possess a time series of survey data to document its course. As case studies they are therefore extremely valuable sources of insight into how the process can occur in developing countries in the current historical period.

The data presented in this paper come primarily from two sources. For Korea, they are from a series of national KAP fertility surveys, with figures taken from previous publications, unpublished tabulations held by the Korean Institute for Family Planning and new computer runs. For Taiwan, data come from a similar set of surveys with figures drawn almost entirely from a special time-trend publication (Freedman et al. 1974) to which this compilation of Korean data was designed to conform. The analyses reported here are preliminary and partial. The reader may obtain a much fuller picture for Taiwan from the original publication.

The surveys were not conducted at precisely the same times in the two countries, and within each country the between survey intervals sometimes included fraction of years.<sup>1)</sup> Points on the various curves presented in the report reflect these differences in timing. To avoid excessive detail on the charts Taiwan points are shown only for 1965 and 1973. The longest gap between any two Korean surveys is three years (1968 to 1971). A small crosshatch appears on each line connecting these two years as a reminder that the smooth slope implied by the straight line hides some variability that annual surveys would have revealed.

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
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<sup>1)</sup>Korea's surveys were conducted in April of each year from 1964 through 1967; from September 1 to October 31, 1968; September 1 to October 30, 1971; and from September 20 to November 3, 1973. Taiwan's surveys were conducted as follows: 1965: October-December; 1967: October-January 1968; 1970: January-March; 1971: September-October; 1973: July-September. In both places other major sources of data are available; e. g. in Korea the large 1966 Special Demographic Survey (Choe and Park 1966) and the KIRBS surveys (Chung et al. 1972).

This report focuses on declining family size. However, it is relevant to note that the overall fertility decline in both societies has been very marked. In Korea from the early 1960s to the early 1970s the crude birth rate fell by one fourth, from about 40 to about 30. The total fertility rate fell nearly 30 percent. Age-specific fertility rates fell heavily at both young and old ages (Figure 1), the latter due to increasing birth control and the former to later marriage. Age at marriage has risen very rapidly to a high level, about 23 for women (Figure 2) and four to five years later for men. The most sensitive age group is females aged 20—24. The percent single in this age group reported in the Korean censuses was: 5

**FIGURE 1 Estimated Single Year Age-Specific Fertility Rates, Korea: 1960—1970**




Source: L.J. Cho *Estimates of Current Fertility for The Republic of Korea and Its Geographical Subdivisions: 1959—1970*, Seoul:Yonsei University Press, 1974.

percent in 1940; 20 percent in 1955; 35 percent in 1960; 53 percent in 1966; and 58 percent in 1970.

The data in Table 1 show the decline in attained family size over the 1964—1973 period. Whether one looks at parity or at number of living children, the absolute decline increases steadily with age. The parity decline is the larger of the two, suggesting the offsetting effects of mortality improvements.

A danger exists in many kinds of age-specific comparisons between Korea and Taiwan because attained family size is considerably less at young ages in Korea (Table 2). Although the final family size by age 45—49 is probably higher in Korea, the pattern of childbearing

FIGURE 2 Trend in Average Age at Marriage, Korea:1944-73



Source: K.Y. Song and S. H. Han. 1973 *National Family Planning and Fertility Survey: A Comprehensive Report*, Seoul: Korean Institute for Family Planning, 1974.

is a later one. Korea's later age at marriage, and possibly longer average birth intervals, mean that Taiwan runs well ahead of Korea in family size for married women below age

TABLE 1 Declines in Family Size by Age Groups, Korea: 1964-1973

Age	Mean Parity							Mean Number of Living Children					
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1971	1973	1965	1966	1967	1968	1971	1973
20-24	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.0
25-29	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.0
30-34	1.2	4.2	4.1	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.4	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.2
35-39	5.5	5.5	5.4	5.1	4.9	4.9	4.4	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.1
40-44	6.4	6.3	6.1	6.1	5.7	5.7	5.4	5.2	4.9	5.2	5.0	4.9	5.2
All 20-44	3.9	3.9	4.0	3.8	3.6	3.7	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	—	3.3	3.1
All 20-39	3.4	3.8	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.2	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.0	—	3.0	2.8

TABLE 2 Korean Family Size as a Ratio of Taiwanese Family Size


Age	Mean Parity			Mean Number of Living Children		
	1965	1967	1973	1965	1967	1973
20-24 <sup>a</sup>	87	75	56	86	73	59
25-29	96	85	78	89	92	77
30-34	98	95	92	92	92	91
35-39	1.00	1.02	1.00	92	98	1.00
20-39 <sup>b</sup>	1.00	97	91	89	91	90

<sup>a</sup>22-24 for Taiwan. <sup>b</sup>22-39 for Taiwan.

30, and the two are not equal until ages 35—39. Annual fertility rates in Korea are considerably higher above age 30 than in Taiwan, compensating for the reverse difference at young ages. Therefore, many comparisons of interest must be done not on an age-specific basis (or not only that) but specific to the number of living children.

In Table 2 note that in 1965 the Korea/Taiwan ratios for parity are systematically higher than those for number of living children for women above 25, suggesting that infant and child mortality played a stronger role in the early years in Korea than in Taiwan. By 1973 the ratios were the same at all ages. The childbearing of Korean women aged 30—39 in 1965 had been affected by the Korean War years, starting in 1950, and infant and child mortality was unquestionably severe in the subsequent period.

FIGURE 3 Percent Currently Using Contraception\*



\*On all Figures, Taiwan values for 1973 appear as ◇

## Behavior

The declines in marital fertility in Korea are related to very sharp rises in birth control, just as they are in Taiwan. In both places, all three types of birth control—contraception, sterilization, and abortion—have been actively used but in shifting ratios overtime and differently in the two countries.


Contraceptive use has risen over the decade in both countries, and more so in recent years, especially during the 1971—1973 period. It has risen within every age group (Figure 3). The level of use has risen even within the 20—24 age bracket, despite lessened marital duration due to the rising marriage age.

The rise has occurred also by specific family compositions (Figure 4). The level of practice follows the numbers of sons, in both countries, rather than the number of children, but of all couples with one son those with three children have recently increased their

practice more sharply than those with two. The Taiwan levels of current use are higher at every age and family composition and are greater at the end of the period than at the start.


For knowing current behavioral patterns, ever use of contraception is an important measure but it includes women whose use is temporarily interrupted. Nevertheless it is a useful check as another, partially independent measure. Taiwan began at age-specific levels like

**FIGURE 4 Percent Currently Using Contraception Among Couples with at Least One Son**



\*Read: three children, two or more sons.

**FIGURE 5 Percent Ever Using Contraception**



Korea's (see the  $\diamond$ 's on Figure 5) but rose more sharply and by 1973 exceeded the Korean level at every age. At least some of this difference, especially at the early ages, reflects Taiwan's earlier age at marriage, and the larger family size prevailing there at ages below 30. It is not simply this, however. When all women below age 30 are compared at specific family sizes, the conclusion is the same. The levels of contraceptive use grew faster in Taiwan from 1965 to 1973. (See Table 3.)

TABLE 3 Levels of Contraceptive Use, Taiwan and Korea: 1965

No. Living Children	Percent Ever Using 1965		Percent Ever Using 1973	
	Taiwan <sup>a</sup>	Korea	Taiwan	Korea
0	0	4	17	14
1	4	10	34	25
2	12	18	58	48
3	23	19	74	55
4	31	39	75	(61)
5+	34	(21) <sup>b</sup>	77	(--)
All	16	16	57	38

<sup>a</sup>For Taiwan, ages 22-29.

<sup>b</sup>( ) is used for Korean data and in all tables, indicates a base between 20 and 50. A dash or (--) indicates a base below 20. Taiwan data were not calculated for a base below 20.

Turning to sterilization, from 1971 to 1973 Korea saw a sudden jump in the proportion of women sterilized at ages 25-39. (Almost no one obtains a sterilization before age 25.) Since 1964-65 Taiwan appears to have relied relatively more on sterilization than Korea, with Korea experiencing a sharper relative rise, at least at the age interval 35-39. Korea has seen more vasectomy in both the public and private sectors than Taiwan. Taiwan, however, has had more female sterilization, the latter encouraged by the larger proportions of births occurring in hospitals or otherwise attended by physicians.

TABLE 4 Percent Sterilized, Korea and Taiwan: 1964-1973

Age	Korea					Taiwan			
	1964	1967	1968	1971	1973	1965	1967	1970	1973
20-24 <sup>a</sup>	--	--	--	--	--	0	0	1	1
25-29	1	1	1	1	5	3	2	3	6
30-34	3	2	3	3	7	6	8	9	12
35-39	1	5	5	6	10	9	11	15	15
40-44	1	3	3	5	6	--	--	--	--
All Ages	1	2	2	3	6	--	--	--	--


<sup>a</sup>22-24 or Taiwan.

Abortion utilization has increased at all ages, and most especially between ages 35 and

44(Figure6). A prominent feature of the Figure 6 is the mildness of the 1971-73 rise compared to the marked jump in those years for current use of contraception and for sterilization. Contraception and sterilization may be driving out abortion. On the other hand, this finding may be related to the "ever" measure, in which the presence of past use dampens recent trends regardless of their direction. Moreover, by 1971 abortion levels in Korea were already substantial, at least by the high standards of Eastern Europe and certain other countries. Recent compilations of international abortion data (Tietze and Dawson 1973; Tietze and Murstein 1975) show the ratio of abortions to the sum of abortions-plus-births, as a kind of proxy for the ratio of abortions to all pregnancies. This measure ranges from 0 to 1, and is superior to the commonly used ratio of abortions to births, as the latter has no upper limit and rises non-linearly toward infinity as abortion increases. The Korean peak of 275-285 (abortions per 1000 abortions-plus-births) stands well up in the national figures compiled, and is about half of the record of 582 set by Hungary for 1964.<sup>2)</sup>

Taiwan abortion levels are lower, as the graph indicates. The differential persists by family size with a broad age control (Table 5). Underreporting of abortion reporting in Taiwan may depress the survey estimates, though this is speculative. The randomized response technique elicited a higher level of abortion reporting there (Chi et al. 1972), but that technique, while promising, is itself of unestablished accuracy, and has not yet been employed in a comparable Korea study. Nevertheless there remains the possibility of greater reporting completeness in Korea than in Taiwan, related to the greater acceptance and usage of abortion there.

FIGURE 6 Percent Ever Aborted



<sup>2)</sup> This ignores three extreme values that lie at a distance from the cluster of high values for Eastern European countries, Cuba, Japan, New York City and the District of Columbia. The three omissions are the U.S.S.R. (750 in the 1960s) and Rumania (802 in 1965) both of which Tietze and Dawson say may include hospital admissions for aftercare of treatment of complications of spontaneous or illegal abortion, and an unofficial estimate of the high 600s for Japan in 1955, 1960 and 1965.

## Attitudinal Measures

Attitudinal measures fall naturally into three types. The first is the ideal number of children, the second is a measure of son preference based upon "ideal" family size responses, and the third is the proportion who say they want no more children. Attitudinal data have been the subject of some controversy; consequently a brief methodological digression may be appropriate.

The question about ideal family size consistently used in the Korean survey, with slight modifications, reads: "Generally without consideration of your own personal situation, how many children do you think is the appropriate number for an average woman to have?" This clearly refers to a general, not a personal ideal. In 1973 the question yielded 3.13 children as the mean ideal for married women 15–44. However 13 percent of the respondents were omitted because they said they had no general ideal. Therefore a check was done against another question that referred to a personal ideal, which 99 percent of the respondents answered: "Suppose you were newly married, and could biologically have as many children as you wanted, what is the number that you think would be most ideal to have?"

TABLE 5 Percent Ever Having an Abortion, Korea and Taiwan:1965–1973

	Korea				Taiwan			
	1965	1967	1968	1973	1965	1967	1970	1973
Ages 20–29 <sup>a</sup>								
Living Children	0	3	1	—	6	0	0	1
	1	3	5	6	11	1	2	3
	2	7	6	10	20	4	5	4
	3	9	11	12	25	6	6	6
	4	9	13	—	(17)	8	13	10
	5+	8	15	—	—	8	19	13
	All	6	7	8	16	4	5	5
Ages 30–39								
Living Children	0	0	(6)	—	(0)	5	2	4
	1	5	10	(11)	(8)	5	13	8
	2	14	20	16	34	6	9	8
	3	16	19	28	36	13	18	21
	4	19	22	25	39	15	17	17
	5+	14	19	19	39	13	16	19
	All	15	20	22	36	13	16	17
Ages 40–44								
Living Children	0	—	—	—	—			
	1	—	—	—	—			
	2	9	(14)	—	—			
	3	13	(10)	—	(29)			
	4	8	27	(24)	51			
	5+	13	16	18	42			
	All	12	17	17	40			

<sup>a</sup>22–29 for Taiwan



This is close to the question analyzed in the Taiwan series (termed "preferred" number of children).

A check between results from the personal and general questions important for the Korea-Taiwan comparison, since the Korea series used the general version and the Taiwan series the personal one. The personal question gave an overall mean of 3.18, very close to the 3.13 for the general question (it was older women who tended not to respond to the general question), and if the tabulation is restricted only to those answering both questions, both means are 3.13, with 68 percent giving identical responses to both questions and 93 percent giving an identical response or one differing by only one child. Those who had a shift of one child in the two response were fairly evenly distributed by direction of the change. The responses in 1973 to the various questions on family size are shown in Table 6.

The number of living children is the present actual number, to which was added the response to a question on the number of additional children realistically *expected*: "Considering your own personal situation, how many more children do you think you will actually have in the future?" The arithmetic sum of these, the actual plus the additional expected, was taken as the total "expected" figure.

TABLE 6 Responses to Questions on Ideal Family Size, Korea: 1973

Type of Question	Mean	N
Personal Ideal (preferred number)	3.18	1898
General	3.13	1671 <sup>a</sup>
Number of Living Children	3.13	1916
Expected No. of Children	3.74	1909
Additional No. Wanted	0.60	1908

<sup>a</sup>13 percent did not respond to this question.

The respondent was also asked how many more children she *wanted*: "In addition to the children that you have now, how many additional children do you want to have?" This wording invites a non-zero reply. The mean response is 0.60 additional children wanted, which if added to the number of living children produces a total of 3.73, the same as the expected number.

These overall figures change when examined by age (Table 7). All indices of course rise with advancing age. The general and personal ideals are never far apart. Among young women the expected number matches the ideal. However, for older women, the actual number is above the ideal. The disparity grows only when the additional births expected are included. All these irregularities balance out to produce the overall similarities previously described.

Age differentials like those shown for 1973 imply that advancing age will change the ideal family sizes now held by young women. This may be, but the age-specific time trends must also be kept in mind. As shown in Figures 7 and 8, young married women in 1973

were reporting ideals considerably below those given by their counterparts in 1965. Song (1975) has presented corroborating evidence from unmarried women interviewed in the 1973 survey.

The differences by age in Table 7 reflect partly the respondent's life cycle stage and

**TABLE 7 Measures of Family Size by Age, Korea:1973**

Age	General Ideal	Personal Ideal	Number of Living Children	Expected Total Number
15--24	2.98	2.84	0.96	2.28
25--29	2.93	2.89	3.03	2.95
30--34	3.10	3.17	3.16	3.63
35--39	3.25	3.35	4.14	4.35
40--44	3.37	3.58	4.53	4.79
All Ages	3.13	3.18	3.13	3.13
N	1671	1898	1916	1909


Source: K. Y. Song and S.H. Han 1973 *National Family Planning and Fertility Survey: A Comprehensive Report*, Seoul: Korean Institute for Family Planning, 1974, p.81.

partly the different concepts governing the different questions. The position taken here is that "general idea" question is serviceable as an indicator of overall trend, and is close enough to the Taiwan "personal ideal" question to give a picture of important differences in levels and patterns of change over time. As to whether such questions predict subsequent fertility and birth control behavior, a recently published longitudinal analysis for Taiwan (Freedman and Hermalin 1975), comparing 1967 statements (about the personal ideal and whether any more children are wanted) to 1967--1970 behavior, is reassuring. A systematic comparison of several measures of family size values is available from the Ichon study (Lee et al. 1968) for Korea, and Freedman and Coombs (1974) have compiled data from studies in several countries including the 1971 KIRBS survey (Chung et al. 1972) in Korea.

During the early years of the decade under review, mean ideal family size fell very little. It was virtually the only KAP indicator to remain steady. Even on an age-specific basis, little in the way of clear downward trend can be distinguished (Figure 7). Behavioral indicators, on the other hand, were changing quite rapidly as expressed both in falling marital fertility levels and in increasing birth control practice. Ultimately the ideal levels themselves fell, and markedly so. The 1971--1973 period experienced the strongest relative decline, a finding consistent with the upswing at the same time in current contraceptive use and sterilization. Thus, new behavior preceded new attitudes, occurring first without significant attitudinal change, and then accelerating as attitudes simultaneously changed.

Focusing next on changes among young women, who due to their very rapidly increasing numbers will produce most of Korea's future births, Figure 8 shows the changing proportion who name a particular number of children as ideal. Responses of four, or five or more, have fallen steadily at least since the 1967 survey, with movement toward three as the preferred response. As of 1971 this downward movement penetrated three and reached two,

FIGURE 7 Mean Ideal Family Size




causing the rise to the right in Figure 8. The "DK" at 11 percent designates those in 1973 giving "don't know" as their response, the first time a significant proportion of respondents had done so and itself a symptom of change.

The Taiwan transition was similar, with the higher numbers falling sharply and with gains for sizes of three and two. As in Korea, the gain for "two" occurred chiefly between 1971 and 1973, a period that consistently shows a quickening of change.

The ideal number of sons has declined, with the distribution shifting sharply away from three or more and even away from two, in favor of one and in favor perhaps of indifference toward the sex of children (Figure 9). Depth analysis of preference structures in a local study in the Ichon area, however, shows no evidence of indifference. This has also occurred in Taiwan with a similar pattern of timing, slightly ahead of Korea's. Son preference has remained stable in both Korea and Taiwan in the sense that the ratio of

FIGURE 8 Ideal Number of Children, Wives 20-29



\* Read: percent of wives aged 20-29 who gave three children as ideal.

sons to total children favored has stayed remarkably constant at about 60 percent (Table 8). In Korea the ratio is stable across age and residence groups as well as time. Each part of the ratio, mean ideal sons and mean ideal children, has of course declined through time in both populations. However, the same ratio has persisted, tending to produce more total births than really desired.

The proportion of women wanting no more children is the final attitudinal variable considered.

FIGURE 9 Ideal Number of Sons, Wives 20-29





FIGURE 10 Percent Wanting No More Children, Wives 29-29



\*Read: of wives with five or more living children, percent who want no more children.

TABLE 8 ~~Sex Preference~~: Ratio of Mean Ideal Number of Sons to Mean Ideal Number of Children ~~Times 100~~. Korea and Taiwan: 1964-1973

Age 20-29 <sup>a</sup>	Korea	Taiwan
1964	0.61	—
1965	0.61	0.58
1966	0.62	—
1967	0.63	0.58
1968	0.61	—
1970	—	58
1971	0.61	59
1973	0.66 <sup>b</sup>	59
Age 30-39		
1964	0.60	—
1965	0.60	57
1966	0.61	—
1967	0.61	57
1968	0.60	—
1970	—	56
1971	0.60	—
1973	0.64 <sup>c</sup>	57

Age	Korea		Total
	Rural	Urban	
15-19	0.65	0.51	0.64
20-24	61	63	62
25-29	61	61	61
30-34	61	60	61
35-39	60	60	60
40-44	62	60	61
45-49	62	60	61
50-54	61	61	61
55-59	60	60	60
60-64	60	60	60
65+	60	61	60
Total	61	60	62

Note: Ratios based on medians instead of means give almost identical figures.

<sup>a</sup>22-29 for Taiwan. <sup>b</sup> 11 percent gave no ideal number and are omitted from the base.

<sup>c</sup>13 percent gave no ideal number and are omitted from the base.

Source: E.H. Choe and J.S. Park. *Some Findings from the Special Demographic Survey*,

Seoul: The Population and Development Studies Center, Seoul National University, 1966.

Figure 10, for women 20-29, shows once again the 1971-1973 discontinuity, and the very high proportions at all family sizes above two who wish to stop childbearing. Even at two, 40 percent of the respondents want no more children. The 1973 proportions wanting no more children at particular combinations of children and sons are shown in Table 9. The Taiwan figures run regularly ahead of those for Korea as they do in the data for ideal number of sons. They do not do so however for ideal number of children.



**TABLE 9** Percent of Women Wanting No More Children by Family Size and Number of Sons, Korea and Taiwan

Living Children	Living Sons	Percent	
		Korea	Taiwan
0	0	5	4
1	0	4	12
	1	14	15
2	0	12	29
	1	16	56
	2	61	63
3	0	31	38
	1	60	70
	2+	85	91
4	0	—	36
	1	65	77
	2+	92	97
5	0	—	44
	1	67	88
	2+	97	98
Total		61	70

### Social Class Differentials


Using wife's education as an indication of social class, and with a crude age control, it is clear (Figure 11) that class related differentials in contraception are diminishing. Use has increased among better educated groups, but use in lower education groups has grown much faster. The same pattern exists for abortion among women 20—39 (Table 10). In both Korea and Taiwan, use among the lower education groups rises much more, both absolutely and relatively. The lowest two education groups behave similarly through time in Korea and Taiwan, but in the two top groups the patterns diverge.

In passing, it should be noted that the intensive national program in Korea has allocated its resources and staff disproportionately to the rural areas, where education levels are lower. In both Korea and Taiwan, the lower education groups have from the beginning accepted at high rates. In Korea at least rural fertility has fallen as much or more than urban fertility. The data show a similar change of pattern for abortion behavior, which has not been openly encouraged by the official programs, but that does not gainsay a program role in the spread of birth control to the lower classes and rural areas, particularly in view of its stress on smaller family size and the rise in use of methods provided only, or chiefly, through program sources.

**TABLE 10 Percent Ever Having an Abortion by Education, Korea and Taiwan: 1965—1973**

Education <sup>a</sup>	Korea			Taiwan		
	1965	1968	1973	1965	1970	1973
Below primary	5	8	20	6	7	18
Primary	11	17	27	12	14	21
Middle	25	23	28	13	17	24
High school or more	27	26	37	15	13	19

<sup>a</sup>For Taiwan the categories are none, primary, junior high or more. Table includes women aged 20—39.

**FIGURE 11 Percent Ever Using Contraception, by Education, Wives 30—39**

### Discrepancies Between Attitudes and Behavior

Over a few years, long standing attitudes, birth control practices, and family size have undergone transitions of the most fundamental character. Inconsistencies between attitudes and behavior unquestionably accompany such drastic change. By 1965 substantial proportions of wives in both Korea and Taiwan were already saying they wanted no more children, but most of these women were using no contraception. By 1973 the proportions wanting no more children had risen higher, but the levels of contraceptive use had in the meantime undergone the very significant growth described earlier. Consequently, the proportions not wanting children but not using contraception fell. Nevertheless the levels of "not wanting but not using" in both societies are still notable even after allowance for none-use due to natural sterility. Abortion of course affords some protection not reflected in these figures, but the presence of inconsistency between stated desire and associated behavior remains substantial, especially so in Korea. (See Table 11.)

## Summary

While both Korea and Taiwan are unquestionably passing through the fundamental transition from large to small family size, there are similarities and differences between the two countries. Both have had a rise in age at marriage, Korea more so, contributing to a significantly delayed pattern of childbearing. Associated with this are period age-specific rates that in Taiwan run higher at young ages, but lower at the older ages. Both societies have greatly increased their use of birth control at all ages, parities, and education level, with Taiwan rising to higher levels at the upper ages, a brake via birth control that compensates for excess fertility associated with younger marriage. Korea has used abortion more, Taiwan used female sterilization and contraception more. At specific ages and family size compositions, more Taiwanese women say they want to stop having children, but they have about the same ideal family size preferences as Korean women. Son preference is strong, in the two societies, and persists even while the ideal numbers of both children and sons has declined. Social class differentials in contraceptive use have greatly lessened. Finally, both societies saw early

TABLE 11 Attitudinal-Behavioral Discrepancy, Korea and Taiwan: 1965 and 1973

	(1) % want no more		(2) of (1), % not using		(3) % want no more <sup>a</sup> and not using	
	1965	1973	1973	1965	1973	1965
<b>Korea</b>						
20-24	8	10	84	—	7	7
25-29	30	38	76	53	23	20
30-34	63	64	66	52	41	31
35-39	83	85	71	41	60	34
40-44	89	92	88	60	79	55
20-29	22	29	77	54	17	16
30-39	72	75	69	45	50	34
20-39	49	56	71	47	34	27
20-44	54	62	74	50	40	31
<b>Taiwan</b>						
20-21	5	16	80	71	4	11
22-24	10	33	84	44	8	15
25-29	37	56	65	35	24	20
30-34	71	83	59	59	42	42
35-39	88	92	61	26	54	24
22-29	30	48	67	38	20	18
30-39	79	87	60	25	48	22
22-39	57	70	61	28	35	20

<sup>a</sup>Col. 3 is the product of Cols. 1 and 2. It gives the percentage of all married women who want no more children but are not using contraception.



and large changes in behavior before any strong modification in ideal family sizes. Despite a high ideal family size however, the proportions of women who personally wanted no more children were very high even in 1965, showing the strong incongruence between norms and personal intent that so often accompanies deep social change. Between 1965 and 1973 new behavior rapidly brought desire and practice into better harmony, as those wanting to stop childbearing took up birth control practice. This occurred more fully in Taiwan than Korea, but as of 1973 the residual discrepancy was still substantial.

In connection with the notable acceleration of change in both places in the 1971—1973 period, one point requires mention. In 1971 in both Korea and Taiwan intensive campaigns of public education began stressing the two child family norm, with the Korean one urging couples not only to stop at two children but to do so regardless of their sex. While a rigorous assessment of the effects of these educational programs cannot be made, evidence from independent sources in both places is consistent with the judgment that they had considerable impact. There also exists the strong possibility that a kind of take-off point had been reached in the accelerating transition to the small family. Subsequent surveys, checking and extending the trends so far visible, will do much to clarify these questions.

### Appendix

For the methodology and basic results of the Korean surveys see the following publications, listed chronologically.

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- , and Marjorie Cooper Murstein. 1975. "Induced Abortion: 1975 Factbook," *Reports on Population/Family Planning*, No.14(2nd Edition).