Dynamic Network: A New Framework for Symmetric Block Cipher Algorithms

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Abstract: In this paper we propose a new network called Dynamic network for symmetric block ciphers. Dynamic cipher has the property that the key-size, the number of round, and the plaintext-size are scalable simultaneously. We present the method for designing secure Dynamic cipher against meet-in-the-middle attack and linear cryptanalysis. Also, we show that the differential cryptanalysis to Dynamic cipher is hard.

1. Introduction

Today the need for good cipher algorithm is spreading rapidly as more people use computer networks to exchange confidential documents, buy products, and access sensitive data.

There are two general types of key-based algorithms: symmetric key and public key [8,11]. In symmetric key algorithm, the encryption key and the decryption key are same. Public key algorithm is designed so that the key used for encryption is different from the key used for decryption. Symmetric algorithm and public key algorithm cannot be compared on an equal footing because each has its own advantages and disadvantages.

There are two types of symmetric key algorithms: block cipher and stream cipher [8, 11]. Block cipher operates on blocks of plaintext and ciphertext. Stream cipher operates on streams of plaintext and ciphertext one bit or byte at a time.

Feistel network is well known network for block cipher design [5,8,12]. And most block ciphers are based on Feistel network [8,10]. Feistel ciphers include DES, RC5, IDEA, and so on. Also, there have been many researches for the attack on Feistel ciphers. Differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis are well known attacks of Feistel ciphers [1,2,3,4,6,7,9]. We note that these type of cryptanaysis are possible in Feistel ciphers because Feistel ciphers involve the operation that operate on for round key and round block.

In this paper we propose a new network, called Dynamic network, for symmetric block ciphers. Dynamic cipher consists of a series of round functions. In the *i*th round function, *i*-1 round block is converted to *i* round block by a sequence of operations that are specified in *i* round key and operate on only the bits of *i*-1 round block. By using the generating-method of round block, we show that the plaintext-size, the number of round, and the keysize of Dynamic cipher are scalable simultaneously. We analyze the strength of Dynamic cipher against meet-in-This work was supported by University Research Program of Ministry of Information & Communication in South Korea under contract c1-1999-5035-00

the-middle attack, differential cryptanalysis, and linear cryptanalysis. As the results, we present the methods for designing secure Dynamic cipher against meet-in-the-middle attack and linear cryptanalysis. Also, we show that applying of differential cryptanalysis to Dynamic cipher is hard.

Our paper is organized as follows: Dynamic network is defined in section 2. Section 3 includes the characteristics of Dynamic cipher. The strength of Dynamic network against some attacks is analyzed in section 4. Section 5 includes conclusion and further researches.

2. Preliminaries

Shannon showed that symmetric block cipher, performing the repetition of a substitution and a transposition, has good strength [13]. Many networks, based on Shannon's theorem, for symmetric block ciphers have been presented [5,8,12].

A substitution-permutation network is composed of a number of stages each involving substitutions and permutations [8].

A round of a block cipher is the composition of at least one substitution and at least one transposition [8]. And a round function is a function performing the substitutions and transpositions by the ways described in symmetric block cipher. An iterated block cipher is a block cipher involving the sequential of a round function [8]. The *i*th repeated round function has two inputs that are a block called *i*-1 round block and a key called *i* round key. And the output of the *i*th repeated round function is *i* round block.

A Feistel cipher is an iterated cipher mapping a 2t-bit plaintext (L_0, R_0) , for t-bit blocks L_0 and R_0 , to a ciphertext (R_n, L_n) , through an n-round process [8]. The ith round block of Feistel cipher is determined by using $L_i=R_{i-1}$ and $R_i=L_{i-1}\oplus f(R_{i-1}, K_i)$ where f is an arbitrary round function, K_i is i round key, and \oplus denotes bit-wise eXclusive-OR. And the ith round function of Feistel cipher involves the operation, performed between i-1 round block and i round key, for the substitutions and the settled permutation-method, without using i round key, for the transpositions.

Meet-in-the-middle attack uses an equation E_{κ} (P)=

 $E_{K_2}(C)$ where the key K is the concatenation of K_1 and K_2 , E is an encryption algorithm, D is a decryption algorithm, P is a plaintext, and C is a ciphertext corresponding to P [8]. Meet-in-the-middle attack makes the key space to

 $2^{|K_1|} + 2^{|K_2|}$ instead of $2^{|K_1|} \times 2^{|K_2|}$. But meet-in-the-middle attack is not proper attack to single encryption Feistel cipher.

Linear cryptanalysis uses linear approximate expression [4,6,7,9]. Linear approximate expression represents the linearity between an input and an output of the round function that is designed to be non-linear. And the probability, linear approximation to be hold, is calculated for finding the best expression. The best expression is used to determine key bits by using some statistical properties including Pilling-up lemma and the pairs of known plaintext and ciphertext corresponded by plaintext.

Differential cryptanalysis uses the pairs of two chosen plaintexts having specified differential [1,2,3,4]. And differential cryptanalysis calculates differential of two ciphertexts corresponded by two plaintexts and of two input blocks of the last round. Many key bits of the last round key can be determined by comparing with calculated differentials.

3. Dynamic network

Dynamic network consists of a series of rounds. In *i*th round function of Dynamic network, an *m*-bits block is converted to another *m*-bits block by a sequence of operations that operate on only the bits of *i*-1 round block and specified in *i* round key.

Definition 1 A block operation is the operation that converts a block of plaintext to a ciphertext. A block operation set of factor n is the set that is composed of 2^n block operations.

Each block operation describes the method to map a *m*-bit block into another *m*-bit block. Dynamic cipher contains block operation sets that are classified by applying method of block operation or used operators. And the block operation sets include basically the block operation set for the substitutions and the block operation set for the transpositions.

Key scheduling algorithm of Dynamic cipher generates *n*-bit strings by using the key. Therefore, one *n*-bit string can be used to determine one block operation from a block operation set.

Definition 2 A *key block* is an *n*-bit string generated by the key scheduling algorithm. And a *key block set* is the set that is composed of key blocks.

Let *l* be the number of block operation set. Then the number of block operation, determined by any key block, is in the range from 1 to *l*.

Let m be the number of key blocks to determine by block operations from each block operation set, and let $\{kb_1, kb_2, \dots, kb_{jm}\}$ be the key block set. Key scheduling algorithm can reproduce a new key block set $\{kb_1||\cdots||kb_m|\}$ by using the key block set $\{kb_1, kb_2, \dots, kb_{jm}\}$. Therefore, we assume that any key

block determines by block operations from each block operation set.

Definition 3 A selected block operation set is an ordered set of block operations, determined by a key block, from each block operation set. And a selected block operation is an element of the selected block operation set.

An input of the *i*th selected block operation is an output-block of (i-1)th selected block operation. And the output is a block that is obtained by applying selected block operation to an input-block. Therefore, a key block is used to generate *i* round block by using i-1 round block.

Dynamic cipher is a symmetric block cipher that encrypts a plaintext by the following way:

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Algorithm Dynamic-Cipher

Input: Key block set KB and Plaintext B_0^0.

Output: Ciphertext B_0^n.

Let KB = \{kb_1, kb_2, \dots, kb_n\}.

for i=1 to n do

Get the selected block operation set.

Let \{A_1^i, \dots, A_m^i\} be the selected block operation set.

for j=1 to m do

Get a new block B_j^{i-1} by applying A_j^i to B_{j-1}^{i-1}.

end for

B_0^i = B_m^{i-1}
end for
end Dynamic-Cipher
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We can see that the strength of Dynamic cipher depends on the design method of: (1) the key scheduling algorithm; (2) the block operation sets.

4. The Properties of Dynamic network

Let O_1 , O_2 , ..., O_l be the block operation sets. The size of O_j is fixed because the block operation sets are nested in Dynamic cipher($1 \le j \le l$). This means that a size of key block is also fixed.

Let m be a size of key block and K be the key. We assume that |K| is sufficiently large for the exhaustive search of the key. And |K| is always greater than m because the design of the block operation set having 2^m elements is not practical for $|K| \le m$.

In case of $m \le |K|$, there exist key scheduling algorithms that can use the various sizes of bitstring as the key. As an example, for a key block kb and the key $K=k_0k_1\cdots k_{|kb|\times n-1}$, the key scheduling algorithm, producing a key block set $\{k_{i\times |kb|}k_{i\times |kb|+1}k_{i\times |kb|+1}k_{b|-1} \mid 0 \le i \le n-1\}$, can use every bit strings of multiple size of |kb| as the key. For a key $K=k_0k_1\cdots k_{n-1}$, the key scheduling algorithm, producing a key block set $\{k_{i\bmod n}k_{(i+1)\bmod n}\cdots k_{(i+|kb|-1)\bmod n}\mid 0 \le i \le n-1\}$, can use any size of bit string as the key. Therefore, we conclude that the key-size of Dynamic network is scalable.

There is no key bit not used to generate the key

block set because of its usability. Let K_1 and K_2 be two keys with different sizes used in same key scheduling algorithm, and let assume that $|K_1| \le |K_2|$. Then, key scheduling algorithm produces two key block sets corresponding to each K_1 and K_2 . And the size of key block set generated by using K_2 is larger than the size of key block set generated by using K_1 . Therefore, the number of round of Dynamic cipher is scalable.

Let O_1, O_2, \dots, O_l be the selected block operation set, U_i be the applying unit of a selected block operation O_i $(1 \le i \le l), \ U = \text{LCM}(U_1, U_2, \dots, U_l)$. A round block with size $U = U_i \times m_i$, can be obtained by sequential applying of a selected block operation O_i m_i times. Therefore, Dynamic cipher can use all of the bit strings with size $U \times n$ as plaintexts. Example of (2) uses two block operations that substitutes by the unit of 1.

5. The strength of Dynamic cipher

Meet-in-the-middle attack reduces the key space in the double encryption Feistel ciphers [8]. Double encryption Feistel ciphers use two different keys consecutively. We note that the key space of double encryption Feistel ciphers using every key bits twice will be equal to the key space of single encryption Feistel ciphers.

Our method for designing secure Dynamic cipher against meet-in-the-middle attack is the use of key bits more than twice. Examples include the key scheduling algorithm which generates a key block subset *KB* by using every key bits, and then generates the key block set by repetition of *KB*.

The use of key bits more than twice affects the execution time of Dynamic cipher because the size of the key block set using every key bits more than twice is greater than the size of the key block set using every key bits exactly once. Therefore, our strategy guarantees Dynamic cipher to be secure against meet-in-the-middle attack at the expense of execution time.

For designing secure Dynamic cipher against linear cryptanalysis, we have to examine the possibility of applying linear cryptanalysis to Dynamic cipher. Let *KB* be a subset of key block set and *K* be the set of key bits used for generating *KB*. There is the possibility that the values of some bits are mapped into the specified values by *KB*. This fact means that the selected block operation set determined by *KB* is linear. In this case, there is the possibility that becomes the key space of Dynamic cipher to be smaller.

Our methods for designing secure Dynamic cipher against linear cryptanalysis are as follows:

- (1) Some block operations doing the substitution should be designed so that any bit of i round block affects to bits of i round block as many as possible. This property makes hard to infer key blocks by comparing with the values of some bits and their corresponding values.
- (2) For any key block kb, the key-block space for deciding the selected block operation set determined by kb must be $2^{|kb|}$. This property includes property (1) and guarantees the non-linearity of selected block operation set. And this property should be satisfied for a subset of the key block

set.

Examples of (1) include the following block operation: Let $b_1b_2...b_n$ be i-1 round block and \oplus denote eXclusive-OR. A block operation performing the substitution is to map $b_1b_2...b_n$ into $b'_1b'_2...b'_n$ where $b'_2=b_1\oplus b_2$, $b'_i=b'_{i-1}\oplus b'_i$ for $3\le i\le n$, and $b'_1=b'_n\oplus b_1$. In this case, one bit of i-1 round block affects n/2 bits of i round block in average.

Examples of (2) include the following block operation set that is composed of two substitution methods. One substitution method is a method described in example of (1). Let \otimes denote eXclusive-NOR. Another substitution method maps $b_1b_2...b_n$ into $b'_1b'_2...b'_n$ where $b'_2=b_1\otimes b_2$, $b'_i=b'_{i-1}\otimes b'_i$ for $3\leq i\leq n$, and $b'_1=b'_n\otimes b_1$. In this case, a size of key block is 1 and the key-block space for determining exactly one substitution method is 2.

For designing secure Dynamic cipher against differential cryptanalysis, we have investigated the condition for applying differential cryptanalysis to symmetric block ciphers. Differential cryptanalysis uses the pairs of two chosen plaintexts having determined differential [1,2,3,4]. And differential of each pair of chosen plaintexts is mapped into specified differentials of a pair of ciphertexts and a pair of input blocks of the last round.

We note that Feistel ciphers use many key bits in a round and perform the operation between round key and round block. Therefore, many key bits can be determined by comparing known differential of two ciphertexts and known differential of two input blocks of the last round. And this is not the case of Dynamic network. See example of (2). In Dynamic cipher, differential of two *i*-1 round blocks come out various differentials of two *i* round blocks because different key block produces different round block. This fact leads that applying of differential cryptanalysis to Dynamic cipher is hard.

6. Conclusion and further research

We presented Dynamic network for symmetric block cipher algorithms. Dynamic network encrypts plaintext by using of block operations that operate on only the bits of round block. And the key is used only for generating key blocks that are used to determine by block operations from each block operation set. This characteristic of Dynamic network distinguishes oneself in networks for symmetric block ciphers.

We showed that the key-size, the number of round, and the plaintext-size of Dynamic cipher are scalable simultaneously. Dynamic network is the unique network satisfying these characteristics among the networks for symmetric block ciphers.

We analyzed the strength of Dynamic network for meet-in-the-middle attack, linear cryptanalysis, and differential cryptanalysis. And we suggested the designmethods for designing secure Dynamic cipher against meet-in-the-middle attack and linear cryptanalysis. Also, we showed that Dynamic cipher is secure for differential cryptanalysis.

We have many research items for Dynamic network

including: (1) analysis of the strength of Dynamic cipher for unanalyzed attacks; (2) design of Dynamic cipher that maximizes the advantages of Dynamic network; (3) search the application that use the characteristics of Dynamic network.

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